Details
Threat model / precondition. The attacker needs to already hold (or be able to obtain) a valid Azure access token issued to the collector's SP for any scope. In practice this is satisfied by: (a) controlling another workload that binds the same managed identity, (b) compromising any peer authenticated with the same SP, or (c) observing an Authorization: header from any prior legitimate request for the SP. This is what drives the 8.1 score — the precondition is non-trivial but is routine in multi-workload Azure environments.
Who is impacted. Any operator of opentelemetry-collector-contrib v0.124.0 through v0.150.0 who configured azureauthextension on a receiver's auth: block. This applies to both HTTP and gRPC receivers — gRPC receivers surface :authority as Host through the collector's header handling, so the same exploit path applies there.
Deployments most at risk:
- Multi-workload Azure environments where the collector shares a managed identity with other workloads (any such workload can authenticate as an arbitrary telemetry source).
- Deployments that forward
Authorization:headers through proxies, service meshes, or logging pipelines (one leaked token is enough, and persists for the token TTL — typically several hours for MI tokens, not the 60-minute user-token window). - Multi-tenant environments where different customers' telemetry converges at a collector protected by this extension.
Consequences. Unauthenticated (from the collector's perspective) ingest of arbitrary traces, metrics, and logs. Downstream effects depend on the collector's exporters and include telemetry-backend poisoning, log injection (masking real attacker activity in SIEMs), metric manipulation to trigger or suppress alerts, cost-amplification against pay-per-datapoint backends, and adversarial traces that corrupt service-graph and incident-triage signals.
Not impacted. The extension's outbound extensionauth.HTTPClient path, used by Azure exporters, is unaffected. Operators who use azureauthextension only on exporters can continue doing so.
Mitigation
Until a patched release is available, remove azure_auth from any receiver auth: blocks. For genuine Entra ID JWT validation on OTLP receivers, use oidcauthextension pointed at the tenant discovery URL, with audience pinned from configuration:
extensions:
oidc:
issuer_url: https://login.microsoftonline.com/<tenant-id>/v2.0
audience: <expected-api-audience>
Resources
- PR introducing the vulnerable server-side path: #39178
- Affected versions: v0.124.0 – v0.150.0
Assisted-by: Opus 4.7