Advisory

GHSA-pp9r-xg4c-8j4x

Also known as: CVE-2026-33241

Summary

Salvo Affected by Denial of Service via Unbounded Memory Allocation in Form Data Parsing

Details

Summary
Salvo's form data parsing implementations (form_data() method and Extractible macro) do not enforce payload size limits before reading request bodies into memory. This allows attackers to cause Out-of-Memory (OOM) conditions by sending extremely large payloads, leading to service crashes and denial of service.

Details
Vulnerability Description
Three attack vectors exist in Salvo's form handling:

  1. URL-encoded form data (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
  • Request::form_data() calls BodyExt::collect(body) which reads the entire body into memory without size checking
  • Affects handlers using req.form_data().await directly
  1. Multipart form data (multipart/form-data)
  • Similar unbounded memory allocation during parsing
  • Affects handlers processing multipart uploads
  1. Extractible macro
  • #[derive(Extractible)] with #[salvo(extract(default_source(from = "body")))] internally calls form_data()
  • Vulnerabilities propagate to all extractors using body sources

Root Cause
The FormData::read() implementation prioritizes convenience over safety by reading entire request bodies before validation. Even when Request::payload_with_max_size() is available, it's not automatically applied in the form parsing path.

PoC

  1. run Extract data from request example in readme.md in docker file with limited memory say 100mb.
  2. Send application/x-www-form-urlencoded OR multipart/form-data payload to the endpoint.
  3. The server process OOM-crashes, instead of returning 413 error.

Impact
Immediate Effects

  • Service Unavailability: Servers crash under memory pressure
  • Resource Exhaustion: Single request can consume all available memory
  • Cascading Failures: In containerized environments, OOM can affect other services

Attack Characteristics

  • Low Cost: Attacker needs minimal bandwidth (header only, body can be streamed)
  • No Authentication: Exploitable on public endpoints
  • Difficult to Rate-Limit: Traditional rate limiting may not prevent single large request
  • Amplification: Small network cost → large memory consumption

Real-World Scenarios

  1. Public API endpoints accepting form data
  2. User registration/profile update handlers
  3. File upload endpoints using multipart forms
  4. Any endpoint using #[derive(Extractible)] with body sources

Suggestion: Make Multipart File Upload Handling Explicit Opt-In

Problem Statement

Currently, Salvo's multipart form data parsing automatically handles file uploads without explicit developer intent. This creates several security and usability concerns:

  1. Unintended File Storage: Developers may unknowingly accept file uploads when they only intended to handle text fields
  2. Disk Space Exhaustion: Automatic file buffering to disk can fill storage without proper limits
  3. Resource Cleanup: Temporary files may not be properly cleaned up if handlers don't expect them
  4. Attack Surface: Endpoints inadvertently become file upload targets

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-03-19 12:44 UTC
Modified
2026-03-25 21:04 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

salvo

crates.io · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 0.89.3 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.89.3

Fix

  • Fixed version 0.89.3
    cargo update -p salvo --precise 0.89.3

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences