Advisory

GHSA-ppp5-5v6c-4jwp

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

console.log('control-forge-strict:', controlForge.ok, controlForge.err || '');
console.log('control-node:', controlNode);
console.log('forgery (forge library, strict):', forgedForge.ok, forgedForge.err || '');
console.log('forgery (node/OpenSSL):', forgedNode);
}

main();

</details>

## Suggested Patch
- Enforce PKCS#1 v1.5 BT=0x01 minimum padding length (`PS >= 8`) in `_decodePkcs1_v1_5` before accepting the block.
- Update the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 verifier to require canonical DigestInfo structure only (no extra attacker-controlled ASN.1 content beyond expected fields).

Here is a Forge-tested patch to resolve the issue, though it should be verified for consumer projects:

```diff
index b207a63..ec8a9c1 100644
--- a/lib/rsa.js
+++ b/lib/rsa.js
@@ -1171,6 +1171,14 @@ pki.setRsaPublicKey = pki.rsa.setPublicKey = function(n, e) {
             error.errors = errors;
             throw error;
           }
+
+          if(obj.value.length != 2) {
+            var error = new Error(
+              'DigestInfo ASN.1 object must contain exactly 2 fields for ' +
+              'a valid RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 package.');
+            error.errors = errors;
+            throw error;
+          }
           // check hash algorithm identifier
           // see PKCS1-v1-5DigestAlgorithms in RFC 8017
           // FIXME: add support to validator for strict value choices
@@ -1673,6 +1681,10 @@ function _decodePkcs1_v1_5(em, key, pub, ml) {
       }
       ++padNum;
     }
+
+    if (padNum < 8) {
+      throw new Error('Encryption block is invalid.');
+    }
   } else if(bt === 0x02) {
     // look for 0x00 byte
     padNum = 0;

Resources

  • RFC 2313 (PKCS v1.5): https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2313#section-8
  • > This limitation guarantees that the length of the padding string PS is at least eight octets, which is a security condition.
  • RFC 8017: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8017.html
  • lib/rsa.js key.verify(...) at lines ~1139-1223.
  • lib/rsa.js _decodePkcs1_v1_5(...) at lines ~1632-1695.

Credit

This vulnerability was discovered as part of a U.C. Berkeley security research project by: Austin Chu, Sohee Kim, and Corban Villa.

Sources & licences