avo
Affected
- introduced
2.28.0, fixed3.32.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
3.32.0
Fix
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Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-53769
Avo: Direct attachment upload endpoint lacks upload authorization and bypasses field-level upload policy
Summary
Avo's direct attachment upload endpoint lacks server-side upload authorization and bypasses the documented field-level upload policy methods such as upload_{FIELD_ID}?.
An authenticated Avo user who can reach the Avo attachment upload endpoint can replace or add attachment content, including binary content, filename, and content-type metadata, on a resolved record even when both update? and upload_<field>? policies deny the operation.
This primarily affects multi-role Avo Pro/Advanced-style deployments where non-administrator or restricted operator users can reach Avo and per-record or per-field operations are expected to be enforced by policies.
Details
Avo exposes a direct attachment upload endpoint:
POST /<avo-root>/avo_api/resources/:resource_name/:id/attachments/
The vulnerable code path is Avo::AttachmentsController#create:
app/controllers/avo/attachments_controller.rb:9-24Current behavior:
def create
blob = ActiveStorage::Blob.create_and_upload! io: params[:file].to_io, filename: params[:filename]
association_name = BaseResource.valid_attachment_name(@record, params[:attachment_key])
if association_name
@record.send(association_name).attach blob
elsif params[:key].blank?
raise ActionController::BadRequest.new(...)
end
render json: {
url: main_app.url_for(blob),
href: main_app.url_for(blob)
}
end
This endpoint creates an ActiveStorage::Blob before validating the requested attachment association and before any upload authorization could be enforced. If attachment_key resolves to an association, the blob is attached to the target record. If the request uses the key-based/Trix path, the endpoint can still persist the blob and return url/href even when no attachment association is resolved on the target record.
The controller never calls:
@resource.authorization.authorize_action("upload_<field>?", record: @record, ...)@resource.authorization.authorize_action("update?", record: @record, ...)This is inconsistent with the rest of Avo's file authorization implementation. The field-level file authorization concern defines upload authorization as:
lib/avo/fields/concerns/file_authorization.rb:11-12lib/avo/fields/concerns/file_authorization.rb:25-27def can_upload_file?
authorize_file_action(:upload)
end
def authorize_file_action(action)
authorize_action("#{action}_#{id}?", record: record, raise_exception: false)
end
That upload policy is used by UI components to decide whether to render upload controls, but the server-side upload endpoint does not enforce the same policy. A user can therefore bypass the policy by directly POSTing to the endpoint.
By contrast, attachment deletion does call attachment-specific authorization:
app/controllers/avo/attachments_controller.rb:27-65def destroy
if authorized_to :delete
...
end
end
def authorized_to(action)
@resource.authorization.authorize_action("#{action}_#{params[:attachment_name]}?", record: @record, raise_exception: false)
end
The asymmetry is:
destroy: calls delete_<attachment_name>?create: does not call upload_<attachment_key>? or update?The field-level upload authorization intent is also documented by Avo:
upload_cover_photo? as an example upload policy method. https://github.com/avo-hq/avo/pull/1625upload_{FIELD_ID}? as the policy method controlling whether a user can upload an attachment, stating: "Controls whether the user can upload the attachment." https://docs.avohq.io/4.0/authorization.htmlupload_file? policy method will be used to "authorize the file upload" in action file fields. https://docs.avohq.io/4.0/authorization.htmlAffected versions observed:
3.31.2, commit 46aa6b3bc9e3283110c39e58cfec8bb95adc1897origin/main HEAD as of 2026-05-29, 9e23ddc88f2b1e762e4a5ec35a6f86370ac16c73v4.0.0.beta.26, 6d339595a27f8779cb99b4aa38ddc97cb702b30forigin/4-dev at version 4.0.0.beta.40, 7ab9794f8b044b11b9677cdc57547d99cf96c3f3Suggested affected range for the GitHub Security Advisory form:
>= 2.28.0
Rationale:
ab5f5970e2aa76e6ca0a95bf04f510ba7ed5e858 (feature: trix attachments, 2021-04-24), first included in tag v1.4.0.667049ceeda838394214489693d088708d9da77d (feature: field level file authorization, 2023-03-12), first included in tag v2.28.0.31b6ef94f8cc4c340a2a75eec36c838cda933ce7, first included in tag v2.30.1.From a narrow missing-authorization perspective, the issue exists fromv1.4.0; the >= 2.28.0 range is a conservative submission range anchored to
the documented field-level upload policy boundary.
Fixed version: to be determined by maintainers.
PoC
A local request spec was used to reproduce the issue. The PoC adds pundit to
the test group and replacesAvo::Services::AuthorizationService with a test double. The test double
records every authorize_action invocation and, when invoked, delegates the
decision to a PostPolicy resolved via Pundit.policy!.
The policy setup is:
PostPolicy#update? returns falsePostPolicy#upload_attachments? returns falsePostPolicy#upload_cover_photo? returns falsePostPolicy#method_missing returns true for all other policy methods ending in ?, simulating a user with general read access but explicit update/upload denialauthorize_action callsThe open-source repository does not include Avo Pro's authorization client. The
critical observation is independent of which client is plugged in: the vulnerable
endpoint never invokes authorize_action at all, so the call list remains empty.
The PoC user has roles: {admin: true}, which is required only to pass the
dummy app's coarse route-level guard:
authenticate :user, ->(user) { user.is_admin? }
The vulnerability under test is one layer below that guard: the fine-grained
record/field authorization that Avo Pro/Pundit deployments would normally
enforce. The dummy route gate is not part of Avo's upload policy decision. In a
deployment where non-admin operators reach Avo through a different
authentication rule, AttachmentsController#create would still skipauthorize_action for the upload.
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
2.28.0, fixed 3.32.0 (ecosystem)3.32.0
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0