Details
The fix intentionally preserves same-origin redirect compatibility while making
cross-origin token endpoint redirects an explicit choice. It also avoids placing
internal redirect state in request_options passed to OAuth signing.
Workarounds
Until a patched release is available, applications can reduce exposure by doing
one or more of the following:
- Ensure configured OAuth token endpoints are fixed absolute URLs controlled by a trusted provider.
- Do not use tenant-controlled OAuth token endpoint URLs unless the tenant is trusted to receive signed OAuth token requests.
- Block outbound application-server traffic to internal metadata services and other sensitive internal addresses at the network layer.
- Place a trusted proxy in front of OAuth providers that rejects token endpoint redirects to a different origin.
These mitigations reduce exploitability but do not remove the vulnerable redirect
logic from the gem.
Credit
Found during the follow-up audit for GHSA-pp92-crg2-gfv9.
Reporter/coordinator: Peter H. Boling (pboling).
References
- Related OAuth 2 advisory: https://github.com/ruby-oauth/oauth2/security/advisories/GHSA-pp92-crg2-gfv9
- Fixed version:
oauthv1.1.6 - Behavior-introducing commit: https://github.com/ruby-oauth/oauth/commit/d74b767f