@budibase/server
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected3.38.1(semver)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-72849
Budibase: Chat-Link Handoff Identity Confusion (Same-Tenant Account-Link CSRF)
Summary
The Budibase AI chat-link handoff flow (GET/POST /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff) binds an external chat identity (Slack/Discord/MS Teams/Telegram) to a Budibase user account. The confirmation endpoint is on a public route (no CSRF middleware, no auth-group gate) and the only credential it checks is a confirmationToken that is already rendered in plaintext into the HTML confirmation page the victim views. There is no binding between the confirmation token and the requester's Budibase session at preparation time, and no CSRF token on the POST.
Consequently, an attacker who creates a chat-link session for their own external chat identity (or any identity they can mint in their chat platform) can induce a victim Budibase user (same tenant) to submit the confirmation POST -> for example by sending them a link that auto-submits, or by XSS/CSRF on a co-tenanted page -> and the victim's globalUserId becomes bound to the attacker's external identity. The attacker then sends messages to the AI agent from their chat platform and is acting as the victim user inside Budibase automations/agent operations, inheriting the victim's permissions on agent operations, knowledge sources, and any downstream automation steps keyed off the linked identity.
---
Affected
| Component | Path | Lines |
|---|---|---|
| Public handoff routes (no auth-group middleware) | packages/server/src/api/routes/chat.ts | 23 (GET /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff), 27 (POST .../handoff) |
| Confirmation controller | packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts | 124-177 (confirmChatLinkSession); the binding at 153-173 |
| Confirmation token rendered into HTML | packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts | 40-60 (renderLinkConfirmationPage); the hidden input at 55 |
| Session creation (attacker side) | packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts | 138-171 (createChatIdentityLinkSession), 173-188 (prepareChatIdentityLinkSessionConfirmation) |
| Upsert of identity link | packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts | 201-250 (upsertChatIdentityLink) |
Affected versions: master at commit 3c8d1b4023.
Reachable over HTTP by: the GET and POST are on publicRoutes (no auth-group middleware). The POST requires ctx.isAuthenticated at runtime (controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:142) -> so the victim must be logged into Budibase when the POST fires (achievable via standard CSRF if cookies are sent cross-origin, or via phishing that lures the victim to submit).
---
Root cause
Issue 1 -> The handoff routes are public and unauthenticated at the middleware layer.
// packages/server/src/api/routes/chat.ts:23, 27
publicRoutes.get("/api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff", ai.handoffChatLinkSession)
publicRoutes.post("/api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff", ai.confirmChatLinkSession)
publicRoutes has no group middleware (endpointGroups/standard.ts:24-25 calls endpointGroupList.group() with no middleware and then .lockMiddleware()). The routes do not have a per-route authorized(...). There is no CSRF middleware on these routes -> Budibase's CSRF synchroniser token is enforced only for state-changing verbs on authenticated routes that are not in NO_CSRF_ENDPOINTS; the public-routes path bypasses it.
Issue 2 -> The confirmation token is exposed to anyone who views the GET page.
// packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:40-60
const renderLinkConfirmationPage = (session, action) => {
...
return `<!doctype html>...
<form method="post" action="${helpers.escapeHtml(action)}">
<input type="hidden" name="confirmationToken" value="${helpers.escapeHtml(session.confirmationToken)}">
<button type="submit">Confirm</button>
</form>
...`
}
The confirmationToken (a newid() UUIDv4 generated by prepareChatIdentityLinkSessionConfirmation) is rendered into a hidden form input. Anyone who loads the GET page sees the token in the page source.
Issue 3 -> The POST binds the currently-authenticated user** to the external identity based solely on the confirmation token.**
// packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:124-177
export async function confirmChatLinkSession(ctx) {
...
if (!ctx.isAuthenticated) { throw new HTTPError("Authentication is required to link chat identity", 401) }
if (!session.confirmationToken || ctx.request.body?.confirmationToken !== session.confirmationToken) {
throw new HTTPError("Link confirmation is invalid or has expired", 400)
}
const currentGlobalUserId = getCurrentGlobalUserId(ctx) // <- victim's ID
const consumedSession = await sdk.ai.chatIdentityLinks.consumeChatIdentityLinkSession(token)
...
await sdk.ai.chatIdentityLinks.upsertChatIdentityLink({
provider: consumedSession.provider,
externalUserId: consumedSession.externalUserId, // <- attacker's chat identity
externalUserName: consumedSession.externalUserName,
...
globalUserId: currentGlobalUserId, // <- bound to victim
linkedBy: currentGlobalUserId,
})
...
}
There is no binding between the session and the requester's Budibase identity at preparation time. prepareChatIdentityLinkSessionConfirmation (sdk/workspace/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:173-188) stores the confirmationToken keyed by token with no user-id field. Whoever is authenticated when the POST fires (and supplies the correct confirmationToken) gets bound.
Issue 4 -> `assertSessionMatchesInstance` only checks workspace ID, not user.
// packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:17-27
const assertSessionMatchesInstance = ({ workspaceId, instance }) => {
if (!workspaceId || workspaceId !== instance) {
throw new HTTPError("Link token is not valid for this workspace", 400)
}
}
The check confirms the session belongs to the same workspace as the URL instance param -> useful for preventing cross-workspace confusion but useless against same-tenant identity confusion.
---
Reproduction
Step-by-step attack
POST /api/agent/:agentId/slack/provision or via the Discord/MS Teams/Telegram provisioning endpoints), the attacker obtains a chat-link token bound to their own Slack user ID. The session is stored in Redis keyed by token, scoped to tenant T.confirmationToken is generated and stored./api/chat-links/<instance>/<token>/handoff with the leaked confirmationToken in the body. Example:High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, last affected 3.38.1 (semver)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0