Details
See: https://github.com/nccgroup/singularity/pull/68
Impact
This vulnerability impacts developers running development/testing environments with Ray. If they fall victim to a phishing attack, or are served a malicious ad, they can be exploited and arbitrary shell code can be executed on their developer machine.
This attack can also be leveraged to attack network-adjacent instance of ray by leveraging the browser as a confused deputy intermediary to attack ray instances running inside a private corporate network.
Fix
The fix for this vulnerability is to update to Ray 2.52.0 or higher. This version also, finally, adds a disabled-by-default authentication feature that can further harden against this vulnerability: https://docs.ray.io/en/latest/ray-security/token-auth.html
Fix commit: https://github.com/ray-project/ray/commit/70e7c72780bdec075dba6cad1afe0832772bfe09
Several browsers have, after knowing about the attack for 19 years, recently begun hardening against DNS rebinding. (Chrome Local Network Access). These changes _may_ protect you, but a previous initiative, "private network access" was rolled back. So updating is highly recommended as a defense-in-depth strategy.
Credit
The fetch bypass was originally theorized by @avilum at Oligo. The DNS rebinding step, full POC, and disclosure was by @JLLeitschuh while at Socket.