github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v25
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed25.3.4(semver)
Fixed versions
25.3.4
Fix
- Fixed version
25.3.4go get github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-44840, GO-2026-5837
Dgraph Vulnerable to DQL Injection via checkUserPassword GraphQL Query
Summary
The checkUserPassword GraphQL query in Dgraph is vulnerable to DQL (Dgraph Query Language) injection. User-supplied password values are interpolated directly into a DQL checkpwd() query via fmt.Sprintf without any escaping or parameterization. An attacker can inject a password containing a double-quote character to break out of the DQL string literal and append arbitrary DQL query blocks.
Details
Vulnerable Code Path
The vulnerability exists in the GraphQL-to-DQL query rewriting layer:
checkpwd() DQL function is constructed using fmt.Sprintf: fmt.Sprintf(`checkpwd(User.password, "%s")`, password)
The raw password string from the GraphQL query input is embedded directly into the DQL query without escaping double quotes or other special characters.
b.WriteString(query.Attr), passing the unsanitized content directly to the Dgraph query engine.Attack Mechanism
A password value containing a double-quote (") terminates the string literal in the checkpwd() function. Any content after the escaped quote is parsed as additional DQL, allowing the attacker to inject arbitrary query blocks.
Distinction from CVE-2026-41328 and CVE-2026-41327
CVE-2026-41328 and CVE-2026-41327 address DQL injection in `edgraph/server.go`, where GraphQL mutation inputs (upsert/delete) are embedded unsafely into DQL mutations. Those fixes sanitize the mutation path.
This vulnerability is in a completely different code path — the GraphQL query rewriter (query_rewriter.go → graphquery.go). The checkUserPassword GraphQL query triggers a DQL *query* via checkpwd(), and this query construction was not covered by the patches for CVE-2026-41328/CVE-2026-41327.
PoC
curl -s -X POST http://TARGET:8080/graphql \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{ "query": "query { checkUserPassword(name: \"admin\", password: \"x\\\") { uid } injected(func: has(User.name)) { User.name User.email } dummy(func: eq(x, \\\"x\") { msg } }") { msg } }" }'
What to observe:
touched_uids field in the extensions section of the response will be elevated (indicating the injected blocks executed)dgraph alpha output) will show the injected query blocks being parsed and executedImpact
touched_uids metrics and server logs.schema {} blocks or has() queries.CVSS 3.1: 7.5 High — AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
checkUserPassword is an unauthenticated query)Affected Versions
All versions of Dgraph that include GraphQL support with the @secret directive are affected:
query_rewriter.go constructs checkpwd() via string interpolationSuggested Fix
Escape or parameterize the password value before embedding it in the DQL query. At minimum, double-quote characters in the password must be escaped:
// Before (vulnerable):
fmt.Sprintf(`checkpwd(User.password, "%s")`, password)
// After (escaped):
escaped := strings.ReplaceAll(password, `\`, `\\`)
escaped = strings.ReplaceAll(escaped, `"`, `\"`)
fmt.Sprintf(`checkpwd(User.password, "%s")`, escaped)
Ideally, Dgraph should implement parameterized query support for the checkpwd() function to avoid string interpolation entirely, consistent with best practices for injection prevention.
Credit
Kai Aizen ([email protected])
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 25.3.4 (semver)25.3.4
25.3.4go get github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0