nautobot
Affected
- introduced
3.0.0, fixed3.1.8(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
3.1.8
Fix
- Fixed version
3.1.8pip install --upgrade nautobot==3.1.8
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-83805, PYSEC-2026-4111
Nautobot: Authorization bypass in approval workflow REST API allows self-approval and unauthorized activation of scheduled jobs
Impact
This is an authorization bypass that escalates into unauthorized server-side job execution.
change permission on the object under review, one-response-per-user) are enforced only in the approve/deny actions on ApprovalWorkflowStage. The generic ApprovalWorkflowStageResponse create endpoint enforces none of them, so a user holding only extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse can POST approved responses directly and drive a stage past its min_approvers threshold with no legitimate approver involved. The serializer also exposes user and state as writable, letting the attacker attribute responses to arbitrary users.ScheduledJob, self-approval does not stop at the approval record. Stage approval cascades through ApprovalWorkflow.save() to on_workflow_approved(), which sets the target job to enabled/active.Patches
Fixed in Nautobot v3.1.8
Workarounds
Restrict the extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse permission so that no untrusted user holds it; approval responses should only ever be created via the stage approve/deny actions. There is no configuration flag that disables the generic create endpoint prior to the patch.
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
3.0.0, fixed 3.1.8 (ecosystem)3.1.8
3.1.8pip install --upgrade nautobot==3.1.8Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0