Advisory

GHSA-q4gh-4ffp-5cg8

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Observed control output:

[{"n":"WEATHER_ERROR","p":{"instanceId":"**SECRET_MM_AUDIT**","error":"Cannot find module '/home/sondt23/Github/Research/CVE/auto-github-cve/github-repo/MagicMirror/defaultmodules/weather/providers/definitely-not-a-provider.js'\nRequire stack:\n- /home/sondt23/Github/Research/CVE/auto-github-cve/github-repo/MagicMirror/defaultmodules/weather/node_helper.js\n- /home/sondt23/Github/Research/CVE/auto-github-cve/github-repo/MagicMirror/[eval]"}}]

Expected control output: the placeholder remains **SECRET_MM_AUDIT**, showing that the positive case depends on the vulnerable server-side placeholder expansion step.

Final repro re-check: both the positive and negative harnesses were re-run after drafting, and the observed outputs above are from this environment. No cleanup was required.

Impact
Any client that can connect to a module Socket.IO namespace can disclose SECRET_* environment variables by sending known placeholder names in object payloads that are expanded by js/node_helper.js before helper processing. This undermines the purpose of hideConfigSecrets: true: secrets are hidden in the HTTP config response but can be converted back into their real values through inbound socket payloads.

The confidentiality impact depends on what the deployment stores under SECRET_* variables. MagicMirror configurations commonly include API tokens, calendar credentials, service keys, or network allowlist values in config/environment variables. The PoC proves disclosure of a test secret through a default helper echo path.

CVSS 3.1 rationale: AV:A because MagicMirror is intended for trusted local/private networks and remote exploitation requires a reachable local/private-network deployment; AC:L because once namespace access is available the attacker only needs a known or guessed SECRET_* name and an invalid weather provider to trigger the echo; PR:N because no application authentication is required; UI:N because the attacker sends socket messages directly; S:U because the impact is disclosure of secrets from the vulnerable application's own process environment; C:H because environment secrets can include credentials/API tokens; I:N/A:N because this report proves disclosure only.

Suggested remediation
Do not expand SECRET_* placeholders in inbound socket payloads. The redaction boundary should be one-way: server-to-client responses may contain placeholders, but client-to-server messages must not be treated as authority to retrieve real environment values.

Concrete fixes:

  • Remove the replaceSecretPlaceholder(JSON.stringify(payload)) call from js/node_helper.js:91-99 for inbound socket payloads.
  • If a specific module legitimately needs secret material, resolve it only from server-loaded trusted configuration, not from client-supplied placeholders.
  • Keep hideConfigSecrets redaction for /config, but avoid disclosing placeholder names to clients when not necessary.
  • Add regression tests that set hideConfigSecrets: true and SECRET_TEST=value, send a socket payload containing **SECRET_TEST**, and assert that every helper receives/returns the literal placeholder rather than the secret value.

Sources & licences