activitypub_federation
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.7.0-beta.9(semver)
Fixed versions
0.7.0-beta.9
Fix
- Fixed version
0.7.0-beta.9cargo update -p activitypub_federation --precise 0.7.0-beta.9
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-33693
Activitypub-Federation has SSRF via 0.0.0.0 bypass in activitypub-federation-rust v4_is_invalid()
Summary
The v4_is_invalid() function in activitypub-federation-rust (src/utils.rs) does not check for Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED (0.0.0.0). An unauthenticated attacker controlling a remote domain can point it to 0.0.0.0, bypass the SSRF protection introduced by the fix for CVE-2025-25194 (GHSA-7723-35v7-qcxw), and reach localhost services on the target server.
Details
File: src/utils.rs in activitypub-federation-rust
Function: v4_is_invalid(v4: Ipv4Addr) -> bool
The function checks is_private(), is_loopback(), is_link_local(), is_multicast(), and is_documentation() — but omits is_unspecified(). On Linux, macOS, and Windows, TCP connections to 0.0.0.0 are routed to localhost (127.0.0.1).
Additionally, ::ffff:0.0.0.0 (IPv4-mapped IPv6) also bypasses because v6_is_invalid() calls to_ipv4_mapped().is_some_and(v4_is_invalid), inheriting the same gap. Notably, v6_is_invalid() already includes is_unspecified() for native IPv6, making this an asymmetric oversight.
Independent secondary finding — DNS Rebinding TOCTOU:is_invalid_ip() resolves DNS via lookup_host() for validation, but reqwest resolves DNS again for the actual connection. With TTL=0 DNS responses, an attacker can return a legitimate IP for the first resolution (passes check) and 127.0.0.1 for the second (reqwest connects to localhost). CVSS for rebinding alone: 4.8 (AC:H).
PoC
1. Logic Proof (reproduced from source):
fn v4_is_invalid(v4: Ipv4Addr) -> bool {
v4.is_private()
|| v4.is_loopback()
|| v4.is_link_local()
|| v4.is_multicast()
|| v4.is_documentation()
// BUG: Missing || v4.is_unspecified()
}
assert_eq!(v4_is_invalid(Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED), false); // 0.0.0.0 PASSES validation
assert_eq!(v4_is_invalid(Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST), true); // 127.0.0.1 correctly blocked
2. OS Routing Verification:
$ connect(0.0.0.0:80) → ConnectionRefused
ConnectionRefused proves the OS routed to localhost (port 80 not listening). Any service on 0.0.0.0:PORT is reachable.
3. Attack Chain:
evil.com A → 0.0.0.0https://evil.com/actorverify_url_valid() → is_invalid_ip() → resolves to 0.0.0.0v4_is_invalid(0.0.0.0) returns false (BYPASS)reqwest connects to 0.0.0.0 → reaches localhost servicesImpact
Suggested Fix
fn v4_is_invalid(v4: Ipv4Addr) -> bool {
v4.is_private()
|| v4.is_loopback()
|| v4.is_link_local()
|| v4.is_multicast()
|| v4.is_documentation()
|| v4.is_unspecified() // ADD: blocks 0.0.0.0
|| v4.is_broadcast() // ADD: blocks 255.255.255.255
}
For DNS rebinding TOCTOU, pin the resolved IP:
let resolved_ip = lookup_host((domain, 80)).await?;
// validate resolved_ip...
let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
.resolve(domain, resolved_ip) // pin resolution
.build()?;Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 0.7.0-beta.9 (semver)0.7.0-beta.9
0.7.0-beta.9cargo update -p activitypub_federation --precise 0.7.0-beta.9Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0