Details
Bypass Evidence
The protection under test is the reduced-trust section filter that is supposed to stop untrusted repository-local config from altering security settings. The strongest counter-argument is the case-insensitive .git fallback in gix-validate/src/path.rs:137, which rejects a plain .git match when both HFS+ and NTFS protections are off. That fallback is insufficient for two reasons verified in source: it only runs when BOTH protect_hfs and protect_ntfs are false (!(protect_hfs | protect_ntfs) at line 137), so disabling a single protection leaves it inactive; and even when it runs, its exact eq_ignore_ascii_case(b".git") test does not cover filesystem-specific encodings such as NTFS short names (GIT~1), NTFS trailing-dot/space or alternate-data-stream forms, or HFS+ ignorable-code-point variants, which are precisely what the dedicated is_dot_hfs/is_dot_git_ntfs checks (now skipped) exist to catch. The boolean() accessor was confirmed to apply no trust filtering (gix-config/src/file/access/comfort.rs:89), and the sibling reads in the same file consistently apply filter_config_section, so the unfiltered read is a genuine deviation rather than an intentional exemption. This issue is distinct from the previously disclosed submodule command-execution bypass (CVE-2026-40034 / GHSA-f26g-jm89-4g65): that advisory's fix changed only the gix-submodule crate and gix/src/repository/submodule.rs and never touched protect_options(), so this code path and its remediation boundary are not covered by it.
Affected Versions
- Ecosystem:
rust - Package:
gix(crates.io) - Confirmed affected range:
>= 0.88.0, <= 0.89.0 - Latest release checked:
0.89.0(crates.io) - Fix status:
0.90.0
protect_options() was introduced in gix 0.88.0 and did not exist in earlier releases; before then the path-validation options were not configurable from repository config in this way. The unfiltered read is present from introduction through the latest published release (0.89.0).
Suggested Fix
Read the path-protection settings through the same trust-aware accessor used by the other security-critical reads in gix/src/config/cache/access.rs: replace each self.resolved.boolean(...) call in protect_options() with self.resolved.boolean_filter(..., &mut self.filter_config_section.clone()) so that untrusted repository-local sections are excluded under Trust::Reduced and the safe defaults are retained. The fix must apply to all three keys (core.protectHFS, core.protectNTFS, gitoxide.core.protectWindows) so that no single protection can be disabled from untrusted config. As an interim mitigation, operators can avoid opening untrusted or other-user-owned repositories with gix-based tools on shared or case-insensitive filesystems; this does not remove the underlying bypass.
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Reported by zx.