label-studio
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.9.2(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
1.9.2
Fix
- Fixed version
1.9.2pip install --upgrade label-studio==1.9.2
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2023-47115, PYSEC-2024-126
Cross-site Scripting Vulnerability on Avatar Upload
Introduction
This write-up describes a vulnerability found in Label Studio, a popular open source data labeling tool. The vulnerability affects all versions of Label Studio prior to 1.9.2 and was tested on version 1.8.2.
Overview
Label Studio has a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability that could be exploited when an authenticated user uploads a crafted image file for their avatar that gets rendered as a HTML file on the website.
Description
The following code snippet in Label Studio shows that the only verification check is that the file is an image by extracting the dimensions from the file.
def hash_upload(instance, filename):
filename = str(uuid.uuid4())[0:8] + '-' + filename
return settings.AVATAR_PATH + '/' + filename <3>
def check_avatar(files):
images = list(files.items())
if not images:
return None
filename, avatar = list(files.items())[0] # get first file
w, h = get_image_dimensions(avatar) <1>
if not w or not h:
raise forms.ValidationError("Can't read image, try another one")
# validate dimensions
max_width = max_height = 1200
if w > max_width or h > max_height:
raise forms.ValidationError('Please use an image that is %s x %s pixels or smaller.'
% (max_width, max_height))
# validate content type
main, sub = avatar.content_type.split('/') <2>
if not (main == 'image' and sub.lower() in ['jpeg', 'jpg', 'gif', 'png']):
raise forms.ValidationError(u'Please use a JPEG, GIF or PNG image.')
# validate file size
max_size = 1024 * 1024
if len(avatar) > max_size:
raise forms.ValidationError('Avatar file size may not exceed ' + str(max_size/1024) + ' kb')
return avatar
Content-Type from the upload POST request. A user can easily bypass this verification by changing the mimetype of the uploaded file to an allowed type (eg. image/jpeg).Label Studio serves avatar images using Django's built-in `serve` view, which is not secure for production use according to Django's documentation.
re_path(r'^data/' + settings.AVATAR_PATH + '/(?P<path>.*)$', serve,
kwargs={'document_root': join(settings.MEDIA_ROOT, settings.AVATAR_PATH)}),
The issue with the Django serve view is that it determines the Content-Type of the response by the file extension in the URL path. Therefore, an attacker can upload an image that contains malicious HTML code and name the file with a .html extension to be rendered as a HTML page. The only file extension validation is performed on the client-side, which can be easily bypassed.
Proof of Concept
Below are the steps to reproduce this issue and execute JavaScript code in the context of the Label Studio website.
<script>alert(document.domain)</script>. This can be done using the exiftool command as shown below that was used to create the following image.exiftool -Comment='<script>alert(document.domain)</script>' penguin.jpg
.html extension.Impact
Executing arbitrary JavaScript could result in an attacker performing malicious actions on Label Studio users if they visit the crafted avatar image. For an example, an attacker can craft a JavaScript payload that adds a new Django Super Administrator user if a Django administrator visits the image.
Remediation Advice
serve view and implement a secure controller for viewing uploaded avatar images.Discovered
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 1.9.2 (ecosystem)1.9.2
1.9.2pip install --upgrade label-studio==1.9.2Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0