Advisory

GHSA-q87f-qc2r-2gw4

Also known as: CVE-2026-54688

Summary

SearXNG MCP Server is Vulnerable to SSRF in web_url_read: the internal-address guard is disabled by default (MCP_HTTP_HARDEN off)

Details

Ref: https://github.com/ihor-sokoliuk/mcp-searxng/issues/87#issuecomment-4645453694

Summary
The web_url_read tool fetches a caller-supplied URL server-side and converts it to markdown. An SSRF guard (assertUrlAllowed, which blocks private/loopback/metadata addresses) exists but runs only when MCP_HTTP_HARDEN=true, which is off by default. So in the default configuration there is no internal-address filtering, and an attacker who can influence the URL can make the server fetch internal services and cloud metadata and return their content. Confirmed on 1.1.0 (default config): web_url_read fetched a local internal sentinel and returned its content.

Details
dist/index.js (around lines 90-101): web_url_read calls fetchAndConvertToMarkdown on the caller URL. dist/url-reader.js (around lines 44-52): assertUrlAllowed performs the private-IP/loopback check, but only when the hardening flag is set; dist/http-security.js (around line 11) defaults MCP_HTTP_HARDEN to off. With the default config the check is skipped entirely. Even when enabled, the check is literal-hostname based with no DNS-rebinding or redirect re-check (the fetch follows redirects). file:// is rejected, so this is HTTP/HTTPS SSRF.

PoC
Re-validated on mcp-searxng 1.1.0 over MCP stdio in the default configuration (MCP_HTTP_HARDEN not set):

tools: searxng_web_search, web_url_read
web_url_read({ url: "http://127.0.0.1:<port>/internal" }) -> server fetched the internal sentinel; SSRF: CONFIRMED

The server fetched the loopback sentinel and returned its content. With MCP_HTTP_HARDEN=true the same request is blocked (policy error), confirming the guard exists but ships off. The same reaches http://169.254.169.254/... on cloud hosts.

Impact
In the default configuration an attacker who can influence the URL (LLM-produced and steerable via prompt injection) can make the server fetch internal-only HTTP services and the cloud metadata endpoint, returning their contents into the model context for exfiltration. The protection that would prevent it is not enabled by default.

Remediation
Enable the internal-address filtering by default (fail safe): make assertUrlAllowed run unconditionally and require an explicit opt-out only for trusted environments. Strengthen the check to resolve the host and reject loopback, link-local/metadata (169.254.0.0/16), 0.0.0.0/8, and private ranges, and re-validate on every redirect hop (or pin to the validated IP).

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-08-19 19:23 UTC
Modified
2026-08-19 19:33 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

mcp-searxng

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 1.2.1 (semver)

Fixed versions

1.2.1

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences