Advisory

GHSA-qm9p-p5pw-jrx2

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

// Only accept the key argument from actual CLI invocations (intended usage:
// cron "php .../cloneClient.json.php <myKey>"). Over HTTP, require admin.
$cliKey = (PHP_SAPI === 'cli' && !empty($argv[1]))
    ? preg_replace("/[^A-Za-z0-9 ]/", '', $argv[1])
    : '';

if (empty($objClone) || empty($cliKey) || $objClone->myKey !== $cliKey) {
    if (!User::isAdmin()) {
        $resp->msg = "You can't do this";
        $log->add("Clone: {$resp->msg}");
        // Do NOT echo $objClone->myKey — it is a shared secret used to
        // authenticate to the configured remote clone server.
        die(json_encode($resp));
    }
}

Additional hardening recommended:

  • Replace the static myKey = md5(systemRootPath . salt) with a randomly generated, per-installation key stored in the plugin configuration that can be rotated (see similar advice from GHSA-wqcc-qf63-c2x4 / CWE-331 on AVideo secret generation).
  • On the remote side (cloneServer.json.php), consider requiring the sqlFile path to be unguessable (already is, via uniqid()) AND gating the dump behind an IP allowlist or an additional pre-shared rotating token, so that loss of a client's myKey does not immediately yield a full database dump.
  • Serve videos/clones/ with an .htaccess/nginx rule that denies direct HTTP access, so that even if a rogue client is authenticated, the dump is not downloadable over the web.

Sources & licences