craftcms/cms
Affected
- introduced
5.0.0-RC1, fixed5.9.21(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
5.9.21
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-50279
Craft CMS: Authorship spoofing in entries/save-entry via pre-check/post-mutation authorization gap
Summary
EntriesController::actionSaveEntry() performs entry-edit permission checks before request-controlled author changes are applied to the model. The subsequent author mutation path accepts attacker-supplied authors / author parameters and allows the change when the current user is one of the old authors. Because the controller does not re-run authorization after mutating the author list, a low-privileged user can reassign an entry’s authorship to another user without holding the dedicated peer-author-change permission.
Details
The control flow begins in [EntriesController.php](/D:/files/projects/cms-5.9.19/cms-5.9.19/src/controllers/EntriesController.php):249. actionSaveEntry() loads the entry and enforces edit permissions before calling _populateEntryModel():
public function actionSaveEntry(bool $duplicate = false): ?Response
{
...
$entry = $this->_editableEntry($this->request->getBodyParam('entryId'), $siteId);
...
$this->enforceEditEntryPermissions($entry, $duplicate);
...
$this->_populateEntryModel($entry);
...
$success = Craft::$app->getElements()->saveElement($entry);
}
The attacker-controlled source is in [EntriesController.php](/D:/files/projects/cms-5.9.19/cms-5.9.19/src/controllers/EntriesController.php):588:
$entry->setAttributesFromRequest(array_filter([
'authorIds' => $this->request->getBodyParam('authors') ??
$this->request->getBodyParam('author') ??
$entry->getAuthorId() ??
static::currentUser()->id,
]));
Entry::setAttributesFromRequest() in [Entry.php](/D:/files/projects/cms-5.9.19/cms-5.9.19/src/elements/Entry.php):1124 extracts the new author IDs and applies them if canChangeAuthor() returns true:
if (
($authorIds !== null || $authorId !== null) &&
$this->canChangeAuthor()
) {
$this->_oldAuthorIds = $oldAuthorIds;
$this->setAuthorIds($authorIds);
}
canChangeAuthor() at [Entry.php](/D:/files/projects/cms-5.9.19/cms-5.9.19/src/elements/Entry.php):2789 allows the author change when the current user can view peer entries and is already one of the existing authors:
return (
empty($authorIds) ||
in_array($user->id, $authorIds) ||
$user->can("changeAuthorForPeerEntries:$section->uid")
);
After the author list is mutated, the controller does not re-check authorization.
This closes the exploit chain:
entries/save-entry with attacker-controlled authors[].Preconditions derived from the source:
345.345, or otherwise satisfies canChangeAuthor() through the old author set.viewPeerEntries for the section.1 exists and can be assigned as an author in that section.Result:
enforceEditEntryPermissions() succeeds on the original entry state._populateEntryModel() reads authors[]=1 from the request body.setAttributesFromRequest() updates authorIds because canChangeAuthor() is evaluated against the old authorship state.saveElement() persists the change and _saveAuthors() rewrites the entry-author relation.345 now appears authored by user 1.Impact
This allows low-privileged users to falsify content ownership and alter the authorship of entries without having the dedicated author-management permission. The impact includes corrupted audit trails, misleading notifications, broken approval workflows, and unauthorized reassignment of content responsibility.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
5.0.0-RC1, fixed 5.9.21 (ecosystem)5.9.21
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0