Details
Run:
./run.sh
run.sh defaults to the validated commit above. To override it explicitly:
PRODUCT_COMMIT=f2d0794417e4d06343e6e7c4722143f5b34bee45 ./run.sh
Expected terminal result:
REPRODUCED: HTTP/1.1 isolates the authenticated backend connection, but HTTP/3 reuses the victim-authenticated backend connection for a different client and executes an unauthorized state-changing request as the victim.
Important observed behavior from the PoC:
- the HTTP/1.1 control case succeeds only if a fresh attacker connection receives
401 - the HTTP/3 exploit case succeeds only if the attacker reads victim-only data without sending
Authorization - the HTTP/3 exploit case succeeds only if the attacker performs
/transfer?to=attacker&amount=5000asactor=victim - the HTTP/3 exploit case succeeds only if the attacker uses the same backend TCP connection identifier as the victim
Environment notes:
- Docker is required
- the build fetches the target Traefik source from GitHub
- no production credentials or external NTLM service are required; the verifier includes a synthetic NTLM-like backend specifically to demonstrate connection-bound identity reuse
Impact
This is a cross-client authorization bypass affecting deployments that expose HTTP/3 routes to backends using connection-bound NTLM or Negotiate authentication with persistent backend connection reuse.
In the verified reproduction, an unauthenticated second client can:
- read victim-only data
- perform a state-changing action as the victim
- reuse a backend TCP connection that has already been authenticated as the victim
Attack prerequisites:
- HTTP/3 enabled on the Traefik entrypoint
- a routed backend using connection-bound NTLM or Negotiate authentication
- backend keep-alive and backend connection reuse enabled
- the attacker can reach the same route as the victim
Deployments using ordinary per-request authentication are not affected by this specific issue.
</details>
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