flowise
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed3.1.0(semver)
Fixed versions
3.1.0
Fix
- Fixed version
3.1.0npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-43995
Flowise: SSRF Protection Bypass via Direct node-fetch / axios Usage (Patch Enforcement Failure)
Summary
Flowise introduced SSRF protections through a centralized HTTP security wrapper (httpSecurity.ts) that implements deny-list validation and IP pinning logic.
However, multiple tool implementations directly import and invoke raw HTTP clients (node-fetch, axiosInstead of using the secured wrapper.
Because enforcement is neither mandatory nor centralized, these tools bypass SSRF mitigation entirely, restoring full SSRF capability even after the patch.
This issue is distinct from specification trust issues and represents incomplete mitigation of previously addressed SSRF vulnerabilities.
Details
Intended Security Model:
All outbound HTTP requests should pass through the centralized validation layer implemented in:
packages/components/src/httpSecurity.ts
This layer performs:
HTTP_DENY_LIST enforcementObserved Implementation Gap:
Multiple tools bypass this layer and import HTTP libraries directly.
Examples include:
packages/components/nodes/tools/OpenAPIToolkit/OpenAPIToolkit.tspackages/components/nodes/tools/WebScraperTool/WebScraperTool.tspackages/components/nodes/tools/MCP/core.tspackages/components/nodes/tools/Arxiv/core.tsThese files directly execute:
importfetchfrom'node-fetch'
or invoke axios without passing through the centralized validation wrapper.
Because there is no global interceptor or enforcement mechanism, outbound requests in these components are executed without SSRF validation.
This renders the mitigation introduced in GHSA-2x8m-83vc-6wv4 incomplete.
Root Cause
Security enforcement is not centralized.
Outbound request validation depends on voluntary usage of a wrapper function rather than being structurally enforced.
Because direct imports of HTTP clients are allowed, the mitigation is easily bypassed.
This is an architectural enforcement failure rather than a single implementation bug.
PoC
Even when an administrator configures:
HTTP_DENY_LIST=169.254.0.0/16,127.0.0.0/8
The following attack succeeds if a vulnerable tool is enabled:
Chat Prompt:
Use the Web Scraper tool to retrieve:
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
Execution flow:
WebScraperTool.fetch() directly.httpSecurity.ts validation is applied.This demonstrates that SSRF protection is opt-in rather than enforced.
Impact
Severity: Critical (CVSS v3.1: 9.1 – AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N)
This issue:
Any deployment enabling affected tools remains vulnerable.
Recommended Remediation
secureFetch() wrapper.no-restricted-imports rules to prohibit the direct usage of node-fetch or axios in tool components.Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 3.1.0 (semver)3.1.0
3.1.0npm install [email protected]0, fixed 3.1.0 (semver)3.1.0
3.1.0npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0