mcp
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.9.2(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
0.9.2
Fix
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Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-33946
MCP Ruby SDK: Insufficient Session Binding Allows SSE Stream Hijacking via Session ID Replay
Summary
The Ruby SDK's streamable_http_transport.rb implementation contains a session hijacking vulnerability. An attacker who obtains a valid session ID can completely hijack the victim's Server-Sent Events (SSE) stream and intercept all real-time data.
Details
Root Cause
The StreamableHTTPTransport implementation stores only one SSE stream object per session ID and lacks:
PoC
Vulnerable Code
File: streamable_http_transport.rb - L336-L339:
def store_stream_for_session(session_id, stream)
@mutex.synchronize do
if @sessions[session_id]
@sessions[session_id][:stream] = stream # OVERWRITES existing stream
else
stream.close
end
end
end
Attack Scenario
Step 1: Legitimate Session Establishment
POST / (initialize) → receives session_id: "abc123"
GET / with Mcp-Session-Id: abc123 → SSE stream connected
Step 2: Session ID Compromise
Step 3: Stream Hijacking
GET / with Mcp-Session-Id: abc123
@sessions["abc123"][:stream] = attacker_stream `# Victim's stream is REPLACED (silently disconnected)
Step 4: Data Interception
Technical Details
The vulnerability happens:
Client 1 connects (GET request)
proc do |stream1| # ← Rack server provides stream1 for client 1
@sessions[session_id][:stream] = stream1 # Stored
end
Client 2 connects with SAME session ID (Attack!)
proc do |stream2| # ← Rack provides stream2 for client 2
@sessions[session_id][:stream] = stream2 # REPLACES stream1!
end
Now when the server sends notifications:
@sessions[session_id][:stream].write(data) # Goes to stream2 (attacker!)
# stream1 (victim) receives nothing
Comparison: Python SDK Protection
The Python SDK prevents this vulnerability by rejecting duplicate SSE connections:
Refer: https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk/blob/main/src/mcp/server/streamable_http.py#L680-L685
if GET_STREAM_KEY in self._request_streams: # pragma: no cover
response = self._create_error_response(
"Conflict: Only one SSE stream is allowed per session",
HTTPStatus.CONFLICT,
)
When a duplicate connection attempt is detected, the Python SDK returns an HTTP 409 Conflict error, protecting the existing connection.
Recommended Mitigations
For SDK Maintainers
Steps To Reproduce:
Please find attached two python client files demonstrating the attack
Terminal 1:ruby streamable_http_server.rb
Makes use of https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/ruby-sdk/blob/main/examples/streamable_http_server.rb
This server has a tool call notification_tool which the clients call
Terminal 2:
python3 legitimate_client_ruby_server.py
What happens:
Terminal 3 (while the legitimate client is running):
python3 attacker_client_ruby_server.py <SESSION_ID>
Replace <SESSION_ID> with the ID from Terminal 2.
What happens immediately:
Impact
While the absence of user binding may not pose immediate risks if session IDs are not used to store sensitive data or state, the fundamental purpose of session IDs is to maintain stateful connections. If the SDK or its consumers utilize session IDs for sensitive operations without proper user binding controls, this creates a potential security vulnerability. For example: In the case of the Ruby SDK, the attacker was able to hijack the stream and receive all the tool responses belonging to the victim. The tool responses can be sensitive confidential data.
Additional Details
Session Hijacking Protection in MCP Implementations
The MCP specification recommends - "MCP servers SHOULD bind session IDs to user-specific information".
Current Implementation Status Across SDKs
Of the 10 official MCP SDKs, only the following implementations bind session IDs to user-specific information:
attacker_client_ruby_server.py
legitimate_client_ruby_server.py
The remaining SDKs do not implement session-to-user binding. Most implementations only verify that a session ID exists, without validating ownership. Additionally, SDK documentation does not provide clear guidance on implementing secure session management, leaving security responsibilities unclear for SDK consumers.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 0.9.2 (ecosystem)0.9.2
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0