generator-jhipster
Affected
- introduced
7.0.0, fixed9.4.0(semver)
Fixed versions
9.4.0
Fix
- Fixed version
9.4.0npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-107375
JHipster: SQL Injection in the Parameter of JHipster-Generated Reactive (WebFlux + R2DBC) Applicationssort
SQL Injection in the sort Parameter of JHipster-Generated Reactive (WebFlux + R2DBC) Applications
generator-jhipster)EntityManager_reactive.java.ejs---
1. Summary
Every reactive (Spring WebFlux + Spring Data R2DBC + SQL) application generated by generator-jhipster contains an SQL injection in the paginated entity list endpoints (GET /api/<entity>?sort=...). The sort request parameter is taken verbatim from the user and concatenated into the SQL ORDER BY clause without quoting or validation. Because the generated query has no bound parameters, the R2DBC drivers execute it via the simple query protocol, so ;-separated extra statements are run against the database.
A single authenticated low-privileged user (including an account obtained through the default self-registration flow) can therefore execute arbitrary SQL: read any table (including jhi_user password hashes), modify or delete data, and drop tables (full C/I/A impact). Independently reproduced end-to-end on the default dev database (H2) and the default production database (PostgreSQL 16).
The JPA (non-reactive) path is not affected: Spring Data JPA validates sort property names against the entity metamodel. NoSQL backends are out of scope of this root cause.
2. Root Cause
The generator templategenerators/spring-boot/generators/data-relational/templates/src/main/java/_package_/repository/EntityManager_reactive.java.ejs (lines 240–253) writes createOrderByFields(...), which renders the user-supplied sort property directly as an unquoted SqlIdentifier:
private static Collection<? extends OrderByField> createOrderByFields(Table table, Sort sortToUse) {
List<OrderByField> fields = new ArrayList<>();
for (Sort.Order order : sortToUse) {
String propertyName = order.getProperty(); // attacker controlled (?sort=...)
OrderByField orderByField = !propertyName.contains(".")
? OrderByField.from(table.column(propertyName).as(EntityManager.ALIAS_PREFIX + propertyName))
: createOrderByField(propertyName);
fields.add(order.isAscending() ? orderByField.asc() : orderByField.desc());
}
return fields;
}
The generated app configures SqlRenderer.create(factory.createRenderContext()) with the default naming strategy, so unquoted identifiers are rendered verbatim. With ?sort=id;DROP TABLE product;-- the alias renders into:
SELECT e.id AS e_id, e.name AS e_name, e.price AS e_price FROM product e ORDER BY e_id;DROP TABLE product;-- ASC LIMIT 20 OFFSET 0
3. Verification
A real application was generated from this repository (git clone of the submitted source, v9.2.0), built with Spring Boot 4.1.1, and run against both H2 and PostgreSQL 16.
| Step | H2 (dev default) | PostgreSQL 16 (prod default) |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------- |
| Error probe sort=name%27 | 500; SQL echoed with raw ' in ORDER BY e_name' | 500; r2dbc-postgresql parse error echoing full SQL |
| Exfiltrate admin hash via ;UPDATE product SET name=(SELECT password_hash FROM jhi_user ...);-- | HTTP 200; name becomes $2a$10$gSAhZrxMllrbgj/kkK9UceBPpChGWJA7SYIb1Mqo.n5aNLq1/oRrC | HTTP 200; same hash read back |
| ;DROP TABLE product;-- | HTTP 200; table gone, subsequent list → 500 | HTTP 200; table gone, subsequent list → 500 |
All payloads executed with a token carrying only ROLE_USER. No other vulnerability or privileged account is required.
4. Impact
CWE-89 SQL Injection. Confidentiality (arbitrary read, incl. jhi_user password hashes), Integrity (arbitrary writes), Availability (table drops). The affected code is produced by default for reactive: true + SQL database + paginated entity (the default for monoliths and microservices). Applications must be regenerated after a fix.
5. Fix Recommendation
In EntityManager.createOrderByFields, validate each sort property against the entity's persistent metamodel (allow only known column names) or render it as a quoted SqlIdentifier; never concatenate raw property strings into SQL. Ship the fix in the generator and advise affected applications to regenerate.
---
Appendix
A. Environment setup
# 0. Prerequisites: JDK 21, Node >= 20, Docker (PostgreSQL step only), Maven (optional), curl, python3
java -version # openjdk 21.x
node --version # v20+
# 1. Clone the generator
git clone https://github.com/jhipster/generator-jhipster.git
cd generator-jhipster
git checkout <affected-tag> # e.g. v9.2.0 (or keep main). Folder MUST be named generator-jhipster.
npm install --no-audit --no-fund # ~778 packages
npm link # makes `jhipster` available
jhipster --version # expected: 9.2.0
# 2. Generate the target app (reactive + SQL + JWT + paginated entity)
mkdir -p /tmp/pocwebflux && cd /tmp/pocwebflux
cat > .yo-rc.json <<'EOF'
{ "generator-jhipster": {
"applicationType": "monolith", "baseName": "pocwebflux",
"packageName": "com.mycompany.pocwebflux", "authenticationType": "jwt",
"databaseType": "sql", "devDatabaseType": "h2Memory", "prodDatabaseType": "postgresql",
"reactive": true, "skipClient": true, "buildTool": "maven",
"enableTranslation": false, "jhipsterVersion": "9.2.0" } }
EOF
cat > product.jdl <<'EOF'
entity Product { name String required, price BigDecimal }
paginate Product with pagination
EOF
export JAVA_HOME=$HOME/.sdkman/candidates/java/21.0.7-amzn
jhipster --no-insight --force # -> "Spring Boot 4.1.1 application generated successfully."
jhipster jdl product.jdl --no-insight --force
# Sanity check that the generated app contains the vulnerable code (all should match):
grep -n "OrderByField.from(table.column" src/main/java/com/mycompany/pocwebflux/repository/EntityManager.java
grep -n "findAllBy(Pageable" src/main/java/com/mycompany/pocwebflux/repository/ProductRepositoryInternalImpl.java
grep -n "Pageable pageable" src/main/java/com/mycompany/pocwebflux/web/rest/ProductResource.java
# 3a. Run on H2 (default dev database)
./mvnw -DskipTests package # -> BUILD SUCCESS
setsid nohup $JAVA_HOME/bin/java -jar target/pocwebflux-0.0.1-SNAPSHOT.jar \
--spring.profiles.active=dev --server.port=18080 > app-dev.log 2>&1 < /dev/null &
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:18080/management/health # -> {"groups":[...],"status":"UP"}
BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18080 bash <path-to>/poc/poc.sh
# 3b. Run on PostgreSQL 16 (default production database)
docker run -d --name jh-pg16 -e POSTGRES_USER=pocwebflux -e POSTGRES_PASSWORD=secret \
-e POSTGRES_DB=pocwebflux -p 15432:5432 postgres:16
./mvnw -Pprod -DskipTests package # prod DB driver is in the Maven prod profile
SECRET=$(python3 -c "import base64,os;print(base64.b64encode(os.urandom(64)).decode())")
setsid nohup $JAVA_HOME/bin/java -jar target/pocwebflux-0.0.1-SNAPSHOT.jar \
--spring.profiles.active=prod --server.port=18081 \
--spring.r2dbc.url=r2dbc:postgresql://127.0.0.1:15432/pocwebflux \
--spring.r2dbc.username=pocwebflux --spring.r2dbc.password=secret \
--spring.liquibase.url=jdbc:postgresql://127.0.0.1:15432/pocwebflux \
--spring.liquibase.user=pocwebflux --spring.liquibase.password=secret \
--jhipster.security.authentication.jwt.base64-secret=$SECRET > app-prod.log 2>&1 < /dev/null &
# seed two products via the API (prod has no sample data), then run poc.sh:
BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18081 bash <path-to>/poc/poc.sh
docker rm -f jh-pg16High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
7.0.0, fixed 9.4.0 (semver)9.4.0
9.4.0npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0