Details
Result: BYPASSED ⚠️ — RCE confirmed
An application passes user-controlled customArgs to simpleGit().clone(). The attacker injects PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always and substitutes a malicious ext:: URL in place of the intended repository URL. The plugin does not block the uppercase variant; git enables ext:: and executes the payload before the application can detect the failure.
Output:
real-world scenario [target: https://github.com/CodeAnt-AI/codeant-quality-gates]: PWNED — /tmp/pwn-realworld created
/tmp/pwn-realworld was created — arbitrary command execution in a realistic application context confirmed.
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Summary
| # | Vector | Payload | Sentinel file | Result |
|---|--------|---------|---------------|--------|
| 1 | CVE-2022-25912 original | protocol.ext.allow=always (lowercase) | not created | Blocked ✅ |
| 2 | Case-sensitivity bypass | PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always (uppercase) | /tmp/pwn-codeant created | RCE ⚠️ |
| 3 | Real-world app scenario | PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always + attacker URL | /tmp/pwn-realworld created | RCE ⚠️ |
The case-sensitive regex in preventProtocolOverride blocks protocol.*.allow but does not account for uppercase or mixed-case variants. Git accepts all variants identically due to case-insensitive config key normalisation, allowing full bypass of the protection in all versions of simple-git that carry the 2022 fix.
/tmp/pwned is created by the git subprocess via the ext:: protocol.
All of the following bypass the check:
| Argument passed via -c | Regex matches? | Git honours it? |
|--------------------------|:--------------:|:---------------:|
| protocol.allow=always | ✅ blocked | ✅ |
| PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always | ❌ bypassed | ✅ |
| Protocol.Allow=always | ❌ bypassed | ✅ |
| PROTOCOL.allow=always | ❌ bypassed | ✅ |
| protocol.ALLOW=always | ❌ bypassed | ✅ |
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Impact
Any application that passes user-controlled values into the customArgs
parameter of clone(), fetch(), pull(), push() or similar simple-git
methods is vulnerable to arbitrary command execution on the host machine.
The ext:: git protocol executes an arbitrary binary as a remote helper.
With protocol.allow=always enabled, an attacker can run any OS command
as the process user — full read, write and execution access on the host.