github.com/getkin/kin-openapi
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.144.0(semver)
Fixed versions
0.144.0
Fix
- Fixed version
0.144.0go get github.com/getkin/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-73501, GO-2026-6095
kin-openapi: ValidationHandler.Load() Fail-Open Authentication Bypass via NoopAuthenticationFunc Default
SummaryValidationHandler.Load() in getkin/kin-openapi silently replaces a nil AuthenticationFunc with NoopAuthenticationFunc, which always returns nil without performing any credential check. Because this substitution happens unconditionally when the caller omits the field, every OpenAPI security requirement declared in the spec is silently satisfied for unauthenticated requests. An unauthenticated remote attacker can reach handlers for routes whose OpenAPI operation requires an API key, OAuth token, or any other security scheme if the application relies on ValidationHandler as its enforcement middleware.
DetailsValidationHandler is an HTTP middleware exported by openapi3filter that validates incoming requests and responses against a loaded OpenAPI specification. Its Load() method initialises default fields before the handler begins serving:
// openapi3filter/validation_handler.go:47-49
if h.AuthenticationFunc == nil {
h.AuthenticationFunc = NoopAuthenticationFunc
}
NoopAuthenticationFunc is defined as:
// openapi3filter/validation_handler.go:17-18
func NoopAuthenticationFunc(context.Context, *AuthenticationInput) error { return nil }
It always returns nil, meaning every security scheme check it handles is automatically approved.
When a request arrives, ServeHTTP → before → validateRequest assembles a RequestValidationInput with the current AuthenticationFunc (now the no-op) injected into Options:
// openapi3filter/validation_handler.go:91-103
options := &Options{
AuthenticationFunc: h.AuthenticationFunc,
}
requestValidationInput := &RequestValidationInput{
Request: r,
PathParams: pathParams,
Route: route,
Options: options,
}
if err = ValidateRequest(r.Context(), requestValidationInput); err != nil {
return err
}
Inside ValidateRequest, each security requirement calls options.AuthenticationFunc:
// openapi3filter/validate_request.go:436-438
f := options.AuthenticationFunc
if f == nil {
return ErrAuthenticationServiceMissing // fail-closed path — never reached via ValidationHandler
}
// ...
// openapi3filter/validate_request.go:497-503
if err := f(ctx, &AuthenticationInput{...}); err != nil {
return err
}
Because f is the no-op (not nil), the ErrAuthenticationServiceMissing guard is never triggered and f(...) returns nil, clearing the security requirement. Control then proceeds to the protected handler (validation_handler.go:61-62).
The critical contradiction is that callers who use ValidateRequest directly with a nil AuthenticationFunc get fail-closed behavior (ErrAuthenticationServiceMissing), while callers who use the higher-level ValidationHandler with a nil AuthenticationFunc get fail-open behavior. Since omitting AuthenticationFunc is the natural default, the majority of real-world integrations are vulnerable.
Affected source file and line: openapi3filter/validation_handler.go:47–49 (commit 30e2923, tag v0.143.0).
PoC
Environment
Docker (any version supporting multi-stage builds)
Go 1.25 (inside the container via golang:1.25-alpine)
getkin/kin-openapi v0.143.0 (local source copy)
Step 1 — Build the Docker image
From the repository root (parent of vuln-001/):
docker build \
-t vuln001-auth-bypass-poc \
-f vuln-001/Dockerfile \
reports/github_web_233_getkin__kin-openapi
The Dockerfile copies the local kin-openapi source into /kin-openapi/ inside the image and builds a Go binary (/poc-binary) from main.go. The go.mod inside the image uses a replace directive pointing to /kin-openapi, so no network access to the Go module proxy is required.
Step 2 — Run the container
docker run --rm --network none vuln001-auth-bypass-poc
Step 3 (alternative) — Use the Python helper
python3 vuln-001/poc.py --no-cleanup
What the PoC does
main.go creates a temporary OpenAPI 3.0 spec that declares GET /secret as protected by an apiKey security scheme:
paths:
/secret:
get:
security:
- apiKey: []
components:
securitySchemes:
apiKey:
type: apiKey
name: X-Api-Key
in: header
It then constructs a ValidationHandler without setting AuthenticationFunc, calls Load(), and sends a request with no X-Api-Key header:
GET /secret HTTP/1.1
Host: example.test
# X-Api-Key header is intentionally absent
Expected (vulnerable) output
=== CONTRAST: Direct ValidateRequest with nil AuthenticationFunc ===
Direct ValidateRequest (nil auth) => ERROR: security requirements failed: missing AuthenticationFunc
-> Fail-CLOSED behavior confirmed: missing auth function is rejected
=== EXPLOIT: ValidationHandler.Load() with nil AuthenticationFunc ===
OpenAPI spec defines: security: [{apiKey: []}] on GET /secret
ValidationHandler.AuthenticationFunc: NOT SET (nil)
Load() will inject NoopAuthenticationFunc, which always returns nil
Request: GET /secret (X-Api-Key header: absent)
Response: status=200 body="SECRET_DATA\n"
[EXPLOIT SUCCESS] Auth bypass confirmed!
Protected resource /secret returned SECRET_DATA without credentials.
ValidationHandler.Load() silently injected NoopAuthenticationFunc.
Security requirement was bypassed. VULN-001 REPRODUCED.
The contrast block confirms fail-closed behavior when ValidateRequest is called directly. The exploit block confirms fail-open behavior through ValidationHandler. Status 200 and SECRET_DATA are returned without any credential.
Remediation patch
--- a/openapi3filter/validation_handler.go
+++ b/openapi3filter/validation_handler.go
@@
if h.Handler == nil {
h.Handler = http.DefaultServeMux
}
- if h.AuthenticationFunc == nil {
- h.AuthenticationFunc = NoopAuthenticationFunc
- }
if h.ErrorEncoder == nil {
h.ErrorEncoder = DefaultErrorEncoder
}
After this change, a nil AuthenticationFunc propagates into ValidateRequest, which returns ErrAuthenticationServiceMissing and rejects the request. Callers who genuinely want to skip authentication can still opt in explicitly: h.AuthenticationFunc = openapi3filter.NoopAuthenticationFunc.
Impact
This is an authentication bypass vulnerability (CWE-287). Any application that:
openapi3filter.ValidationHandler as its HTTP middleware, andsecurity requirements in its OpenAPI specification, andAuthenticationFunc,is fully exposed. An unauthenticated remote attacker can send requests to any protected endpoint without supplying credentials; the middleware accepts the request and forwards it to the underlying handler as if authentication had succeeded.
Affected parties include all Go services that adopt ValidationHandler as a drop-in validation layer and rely on OpenAPI security declarations for access control without adding a separate authentication layer upstream (e.g., an API gateway or reverse proxy). Because the insecure behavior is the default, developers following the "getting started" path are affected without any additional mistake.
Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, fixed 0.144.0 (semver)0.144.0
0.144.0go get github.com/getkin/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0