Advisory

GHSA-r297-p3v4-wp8m

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Verified output:

[
  {
    "key": "target:57390",
    "name": "127.0.0.1",
    "ip": "203.0.113.77",
    "port": 57390,
    "protocol": "rpc",
    "username": "glances",
    "password": null,
    "status": "PROTECTED",
    "type": "STATIC",
    "uri": "http://glances:hash(defaultpassword)@127.0.0.1:57390",
    "columns": [
      "system_hr_name"
    ]
  }
]

This is the same raw object shape that /api/4/serverslist returns.

Step 2: Remote reproduction on a live Browser instance

  1. Configure Glances Browser mode with a saved default password for downstream servers:
[passwords]
default=SuperSecretBrowserPassword
  1. Start the Browser/API instance without front-end authentication:
glances --browser -w -C ./glances.conf
  1. Ensure at least one protected downstream server is polled and marked PROTECTED.
  1. From any machine that can reach the Glances Browser API, fetch the raw server list:
curl -s http://TARGET:61208/api/4/serverslist
  1. Observe entries like:
{
  "name": "internal-glances.example",
  "status": "PROTECTED",
  "uri": "http://glances:<pbkdf2_hash>@internal-glances.example:61209"
}

Impact

  • Unauthenticated credential disclosure: When the front Browser API runs without --password, any reachable user can retrieve downstream Glances authentication secrets from /api/4/serverslist.
  • Credential replay: The disclosed pbkdf2-derived hash is the effective Glances client secret and can be replayed against downstream Glances servers using the same password.
  • Fleet-wide blast radius: A single Browser instance can hold passwords for many downstream servers via host-specific entries or [passwords] default, so one exposed API can disclose credentials for an entire monitored fleet.
  • Chains with the earlier CORS issue: Even when the front instance uses --password, the permissive default CORS behavior can let a malicious website read /api/4/serverslist from an authenticated browser session and steal the same downstream credentials cross-origin.

Recommended Fix

Do not expose credential-bearing fields in API responses. At minimum, strip uri, password, and any derived credential material from /api/4/serverslist responses and make the frontend derive navigation targets without embedded auth.

# glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py

def _sanitize_server(self, server):
    safe = dict(server)
    safe.pop('password', None)
    safe.pop('uri', None)
    return safe

def _api_servers_list(self):
    self.__update_servers_list()
    servers = self.servers_list.get_servers_list() if self.servers_list else []
    return GlancesJSONResponse([self._sanitize_server(server) for server in servers])

And in the Browser WebUI, construct navigation URLs from non-secret fields (ip, name, port, protocol) instead of trusting a backend-supplied server.uri.

Sources & licences