simplesamlphp/xml-security
Affected
- introduced
2.0.0, fixed2.3.1(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
2.3.1
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-32600
simplesamlphp/xml-security: Missing AES-GCM Authentication Tag Validation on Encrypted Nodes Allows for Unauthorized Decryption
Summary
XML nodes encrypted with either aes-128-gcm, aes-192-gcm, or aes-256-gcm lack validation of the authentication tag length.
An attacker can use this to brute-force an authentication tag, recover the GHASH key, and decrypt the encrypted nodes.
It also allows to forge arbitrary ciphertexts without knowing the encryption key.
Details
When decrypting with either aes-128-gcm, aes-192-gcm, or aes-256-gcm here, the $authTag is set from a substr(), but never has its length validated (it should be validated with something like strlen($authTag) == self::AUTHTAG_LENGTH).
For that reason, a shorter than expected data blob will allow for the $authTag to have as short a tag as only one byte (see PHP's documentation%20has%20been%20called.%20Otherwise%20the%20decryption%20may%20succeed%20if%20the%20given%20tag%20only%20matches%20the%20start%20of%20the%20proper%20tag.)).
See this example:
function test($data) {
$ivSize = 12;
$tagSize = 16;
$iv = substr($data, 0, $ivSize);
$data = substr($data, $ivSize);
$offset = 0 - $tagSize;
$tag = substr($data, $offset);
$ct = substr($data, 0, $offset);
echo 'IV: "' . $iv . '"' . PHP_EOL;
echo 'Tag: "' . $tag . '"' . PHP_EOL;
echo 'CT: "' . $ct . '"' . PHP_EOL;
}
/* Outputs:
php > test('myNonceNoncet');
IV: "myNonceNonce"
Tag: "t"
CT: ""
php > test('myNonceNonceta');
IV: "myNonceNonce"
Tag: "ta"
CT: ""
php > test('myNonceNoncetag');
IV: "myNonceNonce"
Tag: "tag"
CT: ""
*/
With a legit ciphertext in hand, this is enough to recover the GHASH key.
With that key, any authenticated tags can be computed offline which allows for decryption of the ciphertext and forgery of arbitrary ciphertexts.
PoC
Here is the SAMLResponse used in the video below: saml_response.txt
Note: The steps from 3 to 6 are implemented in this exploit script: nonce_reuse_with_fmt_val_oracle.py.
You can run the script with sage -python nonce_reuse_with_fmt_val_oracle.py -s 'url-encoded_and_base64-encoded_samlresponse'
https://private-user-images.githubusercontent.com/20672053/531768743-2f6e4a7e-4384-4350-b423-7ddd77aa9152.webm?jwt=eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJnaXRodWIuY29tIiwiYXVkIjoicmF3LmdpdGh1YnVzZXJjb250ZW50LmNvbSIsImtleSI6ImtleTUiLCJleHAiOjE3NzMzMTQ3MjEsIm5iZiI6MTc3MzMxNDQyMSwicGF0aCI6Ii8yMDY3MjA1My81MzE3Njg3NDMtMmY2ZTRhN2UtNDM4NC00MzUwLWI0MjMtN2RkZDc3YWE5MTUyLndlYm0_WC1BbXotQWxnb3JpdGhtPUFXUzQtSE1BQy1TSEEyNTYmWC1BbXotQ3JlZGVudGlhbD1BS0lBVkNPRFlMU0E1M1BRSzRaQSUyRjIwMjYwMzEyJTJGdXMtZWFzdC0xJTJGczMlMkZhd3M0X3JlcXVlc3QmWC1BbXotRGF0ZT0yMDI2MDMxMlQxMTIwMjFaJlgtQW16LUV4cGlyZXM9MzAwJlgtQW16LVNpZ25hdHVyZT0zNDRhZThlYTY5OWNmNGZmMmNmOGJhYTNkNzAwMjNiMTVhMDMxOTIzMGRkN2Y3OGU3NTI3NmFkMWE2OTgwMDFhJlgtQW16LVNpZ25lZEhlYWRlcnM9aG9zdCJ9.X9UVe9qpwX1YQYo34WmUI84KA0a28FKd4SGy15GEVMU
Impact
The general impact is:
XML nodes encrypted with AES-GCM can be decrypted by observing parsing differences
XML nodes encrypted with AES-GCM can be modified to decrypt to an arbitrary value
The GCM internal GHASH key can be recovered
In cases where the encryption key is embedded in the XML and is encrypted with the Service Provider's public key (like often done with SAML), the last two items don't have a big impact.
This is because:
With the Service Provider's public key, an arbitrary ciphertext can be created with a known symmetric key
The symmetric keys are generated on the fly every time the IdP creates a new SAMLResponse
In any case, secrets that are embedded in the XML, whether coming from an IdP, or from another scheme, can be decrypted.
Important: If static symmetric keys are used, as the GHASH key could have leaked, you must rotate those keys.
References
For additional information on the issue, you can refer to this blog post about the OpenSSL issue and how it can be exploited.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
2.0.0, fixed 2.3.1 (ecosystem)2.3.1
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
0, fixed 1.13.9 (ecosystem)1.13.9
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0