Details
Then extend the call site:
return ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsPrivate() ||
ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsMulticast() ||
ip.IsUnspecified() ||
cgnatRange.Contains(ip) ||
isBlockedIPv6Prefix(ip)
A regression test fixture should set up a stub resolver returning each of the four prefix families and assert that safeDialContext returns the "private/loopback" error before any dial.
Impact
CWE: CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (consistent with parent precedent GHSA-56c3-vfp2-5qqj).
CVSS:3.1: matching the n8n-mcp precedent (AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N ~= 8.5 HIGH). AC = High because exploitation depends on the registry host having NAT64 or 6to4 routing — the default on IPv6-only and dual-stack cloud network plans (GKE IPv6, AWS IPv6-only EC2, Azure IPv6 VMs with NAT64) but not on plain-IPv4 deployments. Privileges = None (the endpoint is the login flow itself).
For the official https://registry.modelcontextprotocol.io deployment specifically, this lets an unauthenticated attacker reach any IPv4 address that is routable from the registry's outbound interface — including AWS / GCP / Azure metadata services if hosted on a cloud VM with metadata enabled, internal Kubernetes API servers, internal admin panels, etc. The 4 KiB response cap (MaxKeyResponseSize) limits exfiltrated content per request but does not prevent fingerprinting / oracle attacks (status-code differential, response-length differential).
Self-hosters running the registry on dual-stack / IPv6-only infrastructure are equally exposed.
Why this slipped past PR #1227
The April 29 hardening batch (commit 1201cbd, "security: fix open redirect and add small hardening") explicitly added safeDialContext to block "loopback, RFC1918, link-local, multicast, CGNAT, or IP-literal/single-label" addresses. The author correctly identified the IPv4 attack surface and the link-local cloud-metadata vector, but composed the blocklist from Go's per-class stdlib helpers — which collectively miss the IPv6 prefix families that *embed* IPv4. The same gap was caught and fixed in n8n-mcp (GHSA-56c3-vfp2-5qqj). No commits in git log --since=2026-03-01 internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/http.go reference 6to4 / NAT64 / site-local.
Credit
Reported by Matteo Panzeri (GitHub: matte1782).