Advisory

GHSA-r7fx-8g49-7hhr

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

CVSS 4.0 rationale:

  • AV:N: the issue is exploitable through the web application.
  • AC:L: no special race condition or complex setup is required after page editing access is obtained.
  • AT:P: exploitation requires the malicious Markdown/media reference to be stored in page content and later rendered to a victim.
  • PR:H: the attacker needs page editing capability.
  • UI:P: a victim must view the affected page. The demonstrated onload payload executes on passive page rendering, without requiring a click or form submission by the victim.
  • VC:H/VI:L/VA:N: confidentiality impact can be high when the victim is an administrator or reviewer; integrity impact is limited; no direct availability impact was demonstrated.
  • SC:H/SI:L/SA:N: the injected script executes in the browser/application context and may affect subsequent same-origin interactions available to the victim.

Maintainer note — fix applied (2026-04-24)

Fixed in Grav core on the 2.0 branch: commit `5a12f9be8` — will ship in 2.0.0-beta.2.

What changed: MediaObjectTrait::attribute() — the sink reached by Markdown like ![alt](img.gif?attribute=onload,alert(1)) — now gates the attribute name through an allowlist regex (^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_:.\-]*$) plus an explicit denylist of script-context names:

  • any on* handler (case-insensitive)
  • style (inline CSS expression risk)
  • xmlns (XML namespace tricks)
  • srcdoc (iframe sandbox bypass)
  • formaction (form action override)

Invalid names are silently dropped — the attribute isn't stored, so it doesn't survive into the rendered <img>. src/href/data-*/aria-*/standard media attributes are unaffected.

Files:

Discoverers

@K-Czaplicki
@morzelowski

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Sources & licences