adm-zip
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.6.1(semver)
Fixed versions
0.6.1
Fix
- Fixed version
0.6.1npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-92000
adm-zip: Decompression-bomb protection (fix for CVE-2026-39244) can be bypassed by declaring uncompressed size as 0
Affected package: adm-zip (npm)
Affected version: 0.6.0
Summary
The fix shipped for CVE-2026-39244 (methods/inflater.js) caps zlib's decompression output via maxOutputLength: expectedLength, where expectedLength is read directly from the ZIP entry's attacker-controlled "uncompressed size" header field (CENLEN/LOCLEN). This cap is only applied when expectedLength > 0:
const option = version >= 15 && expectedLength > 0 ? { maxOutputLength: expectedLength } : {};
return zlib.inflateRawSync(inbuf, option);
If an attacker sets the declared uncompressed-size field to exactly 0, this condition is false, option becomes {}, and no output cap is passed to zlib at all. Node then falls back to zlib's own internal default limit (several GB), so a small, highly-compressible payload can still be decompressed to a very large size in memory -- the same class of resource-exhaustion issue the original CVE addressed, just triggered differently.
Steps to Reproduce
0. The compressed bytes and CRC32 are left untouched -- CRC validation still passes because CRC is computed over the real decompressed output, not the declared size.new AdmZip(buffer) and call .getEntries()[0].getData() (or readFile/readAsText/extractAllTo/etc. -- all share the same code path).Cannot create a Buffer larger than N bytes.Proof of Concept
Attached script demonstrates a controlled A/B comparison using the identical real payload in both cases -- only the declared-size header field differs:
expectedLength > 0.Verified reproducible across 3 independent runs.
Impact
Any application that calls adm-zip's read/extract methods on an untrusted ZIP file (upload handlers, CI artifact extraction, email attachment scanning, etc.) can be made to allocate an amount of memory bounded only by zlib's own internal default rather than any limit the application or adm-zip intends -- a small (tens-of-MB) upload can trigger multi-GB memory consumption, risking process crash/OOM.
Suggested Fix
Apply maxOutputLength unconditionally (e.g. defaulting to a sane absolute ceiling, or always passing the declared size regardless of whether it's 0), and/or add an independent compression-ratio check that doesn't rely solely on the attacker-supplied size field.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 0.6.1 (semver)0.6.1
0.6.1npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0