@angular/core
Affected
- introduced
22.0.0-next.0, fixed22.0.1(semver)
Fixed versions
22.0.1
Fix
- Fixed version
22.0.1npm install @angular/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-54267
Angular Client Hydration DOM Clobbering & Response-Cache Poisoning
To optimize client-side bootstrap in Server-Side Rendered (SSR) environments, Angular supports Hydration via provideClientHydration(). During SSR, Angular serializes the application's runtime state (such as cached HttpClient responses) and outputs it into the HTML stream as a <script> tag with a predictable identifier:
<script type="application/json" id="ng-state">
{"some-api-url": {"body": ...}}
</script>
During client bootstrap, Angular recovers this state by looking up the element via document.getElementById('ng-state') and parsing its text content.
Because the DOM element lookup for the state container is predictable and relies solely on the ID selector (ng-state), it is susceptible to DOM Clobbering.
If the application binds untrusted user input or CMS content to element properties such as id (e.g., <div [id]="userInput"> or <a id="ng-state">) *before* the genuine <script> tag is parsed by the browser, the attacker-controlled element takes precedence in the DOM lookup.
During hydration, when Angular calls document.getElementById('ng-state'), the browser returns the attacker's clobbered element. Angular then attempts to parse the text content or attributes of this clobbered element as JSON.
Impact
By clobbering the state element, the attacker can inject a custom JSON payload into Angular's TransferState cache. The most critical exploitation vector is poisoning the HTTP Transfer Cache.
ng-state element containing custom JSON. HttpClient checks TransferState before making requests. Finding the poisoned key, HttpClient returns the forged response instantly instead of requesting the genuine backend API.Depending on how the application processes and renders the affected API response, this can lead to:
Patched Versions
Workarounds
If you cannot immediately update to a patched Angular version, apply the following workarounds:
A. Avoid Dynamic/User-Controlled IDs
Avoid binding raw user-supplied values or dynamic CMS IDs directly to element attributes. If dynamic IDs are required, sanitize them or prepend a static safe prefix:
<!-- Vulnerable Pattern -->
<div [id]="userControlledInput">...</div>
<!-- Mitigated Pattern -->
<div [id]="'safe-prefix-' + userControlledInput">...</div>
B. Configure a Custom Application ID
Declaring a unique, non-predictable APP_ID changes the ID suffix of the state element, making it harder for attackers to predict and target:
// app.config.ts
import { APP_ID } from '@angular/core';
import { provideClientHydration } from '@angular/platform-browser';
export const appConfig = {
providers: [
{ provide: APP_ID, useValue: 'unique-obfuscated-app-id' },
provideClientHydration()
]
};
This changes the state element lookup ID from ng-state to unique-obfuscated-app-id-state.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
22.0.0-next.0, fixed 22.0.1 (semver)22.0.1
22.0.1npm install @angular/[email protected]21.0.0-next.0, fixed 21.2.17 (semver)21.2.17
21.2.17npm install @angular/[email protected]20.0.0-next.0, fixed 20.3.25 (semver)20.3.25
20.3.25npm install @angular/[email protected]0, last affected 19.2.25 (semver)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0