postcss-selector-parser
Affected
- introduced
7.0.0, fixed7.1.6(semver)
Fixed versions
7.1.6
Fix
- Fixed version
7.1.6npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-104844
PostCSS: Quadratic complexity in flat selector parsing allows CPU exhaustion
Impact
. and # are not word delimiters in the tokenizer, so a flat selector such as.a.a.a... reaches splitWord() as a single word token carrying n class or id
indexes. Three passes scanned those index arrays linearly for every index,
making the parse O(n^2) in the number of indexes rather than in input length:uniqs(), the indices.forEach loop, and the Sass-interpolation filter.
Parsing a 400 KB flat selector took ~34 s on a modern laptop, fully occupying a
single thread. A benign selector of identical byte size parses in tens of
milliseconds, so the cost is driven by the index count, not the input size.
The nesting depth of such a selector is 0, so the maxNestingDepth guard added
in 7.1.3 offers no protection.
Reachability is deployment dependent. Only consumers that parse untrusted,
attacker-supplied selectors synchronously in a request path are exposed, for
example CSS sanitizers, CSS-in-JS services and online playgrounds. Ordinary
build-time use on trusted sources is not affected.
Patches
Fixed in 7.1.6. The three passes now use Set membership tests, making parsing
linear in the number of indexes. There is no behaviour change: parsing is
byte-identical on a differential corpus of 8413 selectors.
Workarounds
Cap the size of selectors accepted from untrusted sources before parsing.
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
7.0.0, fixed 7.1.6 (semver)7.1.6
7.1.6npm install [email protected]0, fixed 6.1.5 (semver)6.1.5
6.1.5npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0